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Summary  findings
Almost  a decade  after  Argentina  began  privatizing  its  loopholes  remained.  Those  unforeseen  events  have
railways,  resolution  of the conflicts  between  regulators,  happened,  and the  regulatory  agency,  the  CNRT,  has
users,  and  operators  continues  to take longer,  and to be  had to adapt  its  procedures  and decisions  to available
more  difficult,  than  expected.  Campos-M6ndez,  Estache,  information.  In  some cases,  alleged  modifications  of the
and Trujillo  contend  that  many  of these  conflicts  arose  operating  environment  have led to renegotiations.
because  there  are no ru]es  for interactions  between  the  Changes  have  been  introduced  in the  approach  to
key stakeholders:  government,  regulators,  users,  unions,  furnishing  information  to the government  for  oversight
and the  media.  and regulatory  accounting.  The  changes  center  on clearer
One  result  of inexperience  in setting  up concession  definitions  in connection  with  four  major  issues:
agreements  has been  that  the  agreements  did  not  clearly  *  The  harmonization  and comparison  of  accounting
define the information needed for oversight and  data.
regulation. Argentine rail concession contracts were  *  The measurement of efficiency.
supposed to be specific about the way tariffs, quality,  *  Access prices.
investment, exclusivity, and so on, would change over  *  The financial model.
time. And the newly created regulatory bodies were  Circumstances in the Argentine rail industry early in
given some discretion about adjusting the contracts in the  2001 did not favor dramatic changes, but currenlt
face of unforeseen developments.  renegotiations could be used to adjust information
However,  initial  privatizations  were  carried  out  in such  requirements  to reflect  what  has been  learned  through
a way that there was no time to refine terms, so many  six years of experience.
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21.  INTRODUCTION
Almost a decade after its privatization experience started, Argentina has achieved a lot of
improvements in the delivery of most of its infrastructure services. Argentina is way ahead
of many countries in the regulatory learning curve and continues its efforts to build up its
regulatory capacity. However, the change has not been problem-free. The reform of the
transport sector in particular has not been as smooth as many had expected or at least hoped
for at the beginning of the reform process. Most rail concessions and toll roads have been
renegotiated or are up for renegotiation. This adjustment is not unusual in itself and is
somewhat expected for a  precursor in  a  sector in  which many stakeholders - unions,
truckers among the most vocals - have never really stopped questioning the process. The
resolution of the conflicts, in particular the tensions between the regulators, the users and
the operators is however somewhat slower and more difficult than expected by many of the
observers of Argentina's privatizations.
This paper argues that many of these conflicts are the result of a failure to create a
set of rules of interactions between the key stakeholders - government, regulators, users,
unions and the media. Most concession contracts proved to be incomplete in terms of the
information requirements needed to  anticipate pricing and investment related problems.
Moreover, the necessary autonomous but accountable regulatory capacity has never been
fully  developed  for  this  sector  in  Argentina.  In  particular,  as  the  level  of  private
participation increases in the sector, Argentina's problem was every regulator's  problem:
how to regulate monopolies when the actual cost and production information is directly
controlled by these monopolies. To be effective, any regulatory agencies has to be granted
access to a minimum level of consistent information. It must also be given instructions on
the mechanisms it needs to follow to use this information and how to tailor them to the
regulatory commitments. It must also be given the necessary enforcement power when any
of the players fails to comply. The big questions are: how and to what extent? Argentina's
transport sector has not yet been able to answer these questions and many of the tense
situations observed over the last 2 to 3 years are the product of this incomplete regulatory
capacity.
In  practice,  the  main  information  channels  between  transport  operators  and
regulatory agencies are the firms' accounting statements. Because the operators have only a
limited capacity to generate the appropriate information, regulators end up relying as much
as  possible  on standard accounting data to  describe the past  and the present  of the
regulated company, and to make inference about its future performance. The poverty of
Argentina's  standard  accounting information is  such  that  it  limits  the  ability of  any
regulator to deliver on many of its most basic obligations and points to the clear need for
the regulator to  better  use  its  leverage on the  firms to  get them  to  generate more of
information relevant to the regulatory accounting needs.' Which information to ask, how
I  Several  recent papers have dealt with the issue of regulatory  accounting.  Carey et  al.  (1994)  provide a
detailed  account  and examples  of the relationship  between  accounting  practices  and regulatory  process  in the
UK. The overall  relationship  between  information  and accounting  is studied in Burns and Estache  (1998),
whereas  an example  of regulatory  accounting  for Brazilian  railways  can  be found  in Alexander  et al. (1999).
3to ask for it and how to use it are the main topics covered in the paper. The discussion is
built  around  specific  on-going  regulatory  issues  in  Argentina's  railways  including
efficiency measurement, access tolls, price-setting, renegotiation - where the availability of
adequate regulatory accounting procedures could make an essential difference.
To  address these issues, the  structure of this  document is as follows. Section 2
discusses in some detail the main regulatory functions and information needs in contexts
where  concession contracts are  in  use,  adapting general well-known  principles  to  the
Argentine railways  case.  Section 3  identifies efficiency measurement as  one  of  those
particular needs in the Argentine case and provides elements for regulatory accounting on
this  issue.  Section  4  analyzes access prices  as  a  second  example of  what  regulatory
accounting can and cannot do. Finally, Section 5 deals with two other important issues for
Argentina's  railways: pricing  and  information for  renegotiation, two critically relevant
issues at the moment. Section 6 concludes identifying the main weaknesses and strengths of
the current practices and provides some practical recommendations for its improvement.
2.  REGULATION  AND INFORMATION  IN ARGENTINA
Since 1990 Argentina has experienced an unprecedented process of transfer of services and
publicly-owned  firms  to  the  private  sector, both  by  selling  assets  and  by  concession
contracts. The national railroad (Ferrocarriles Argentinos, FA) was privatized during the
1989-1995 period, after years of mismanagement, deteriorating services and huge increases
in operating losses. The privatization was carried out by dividing FA into three business
units: freight, commuter and intercity passenger services. Freight services were awarded in
six  concessions to  private  operators. FA's  urban  commuter railroad  services, centered
around the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area, were divided into separate lines and offered in
seven concessions (one of which also included the municipally-owned subway system). All
intercity passenger services were offered to the provinces, but most of them were ultimately
abandoned. 2 The main changes in the industry and the current situation are summarized in
Table 2.1.
From the  point of  view of  regulation (and,  in  particular, with  reference to  its
implications  for  regulatory  accounting), the  reform  of  Argentina's  railways  has  had
different consequences for the operation of each of the former FA business units. In the
case of intercity passenger services, all the management responsibility was transferred to
the provinces. Freight railways continued to be vertically integrated and the concessionaires
become  responsible  for  delivering  services  and  maintaining  infrastructures.  In  the
commuter services, the Federal Government kept the main responsibility for infrastructure
improvements, whereas in the case of the Buenos Aires subway that duty corresponded to
the municipality.
2 A recent summary  and detailed  description  and analysis  of the changes  in the Argentine  rail sector can be
found in Thompson (2000) and Campos and Estache (2001).
4Table  2.1.  Argentina's  railways  privatization  and  current  situation
Typ eoprocems  Curent optorsa  Current  situafton
1  0-year  concession  contract  of  rolling  -Ferroexpreso  Pampeano  (FEPSA)  Investment  commitments
stock,  infrastructure  and  services  in  - Nuevo  Central  Argentino  (NCA)  have  not  been  fulfilled. Freigh  exchange  for a canon  payment  to the  -Frou  oa(S)Otu  nrae  eo
Railways Government.  Concessionaires  Buenos  Aires  al Pacifico  (BAP)  expetins.  Strtn
committed  a volume  of investment  in  BunsArsa.  aiio(A)  epcain.Satn
their  winning  bids.  - Mesopotamico  Gral.  Urquiza  (MGU)  renegotiation  process.
1  0-year  management  contract  for  Demand  exceeded
passenger  services  (including  - Trenes  de Bs.  Aires  (TBA)  (2 lines)  predictions.  More
C;ommuter subways).  (20 years  for Metrovias).  - Metrovias  (1 line  + Subway)  investment  was needed.
Services  Government  pays  an operating  - Ferrovias  (1 line)  Renegotiation  just
subsidy  or receives  a canon  and  - Metropolitano  (3 lines)  concluded  with some
finances  infrastructure  investments.  concessionaires.
Transfer  of rolling  stock,  tracks  and  Several  companies  owned  by  Direct  operation  with
InercitZy  services  to provinces.  Services  not  Provincial  Governments.  The  most  subsidies.  Concession
Passenger  transferred  or non-accepted  by  the  important  one is in the  Buenos  Aires  project  for Ferrobaires,
provinces  were  discontinued.  Province  (Ferrobaires) 3 not  yet defined.
8  A sixth  freight  concession  corresponding  to Ferrocarril Belgrano is currently  being  operated  by the  unions,  with  Goverment support.
Since the conclusion of the rail restructuring process, the Argentine government has
been facing three main challenges:
*  the need of outlining a new institutional structure for the sector since the reform;
D the redefinition of the regulatory objectives in the context of private participation, and
*  the definition of adequate operating procedures to reach these objectives efficiently.
These  three  elements are  crucial for the  understanding of  the  main  issues related  to
regulatory accounting and we review them in turn.
2.1.  The new institutional structure for regulation:  who should do it?
The federal structure of the country and the large asymmetry between the provinces and the
Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area in terms of population and economic activity results a
differentiated regulatory responsibility. In the provinces rail regulation is still in the hands
of dedicated units within their respective provincial transport secretariats These units have
exclusive jurisdiction over the intercity passenger railroads that were transferred to them.
Freight rail concessions are entirely under the jurisdiction of  the Federal Government,
although they have to grant access to passenger services by contract.
3 Apart from  Buenos Aires, other provinces that have dedicated rail units for intercity passenger services are
Rio Negro, Chubut, Chaco, C6rdoba, Tucuman and Salta.
5On the other hand,  transportation in the Metropolitan Area  of Buenos  Aires  is
subject  to  the  regulatory  and  fiscal  policies  of  the  federal,  provincial and  municipal
Governrnents. The Federal Government is responsible for construction and maintenance of
national highways, for  financing investments and  operating subsidies for the  suburban
railways and the subway, for regulating the commuter bus lines that connect the city with
its  suburban districts  and for regulating the buses operating entirely within the city  of
Buenos Aires. Furthermore, the Federal Government's traffic police division is responsible
for  traffic  control  and  enforcement. The  Provincial  Government  of  Buenos  Aires  is
responsible for the construction and maintenance of provincial roads, the rail passenger
services between Buenos Aires and Mar del Plata and also controls inter-municipal bus
lines. Finally, the Municipality of the City of Buenos Aires is the owner of the subway
infrastructure and rolling stock and is in charge of road and traffic management within the
boundaries of the city.
In 1996 National Decree 1143 established the framework for the privatization of the
Buenos Aires subway and the concessioning of the commuter rail services. This Decree
also approved the agreement between the Ministry of Economy, Public Works and Services
and the Municipality of the City of Buenos Aires for the creation of a Metropolitan Area
Transport Authority (ATAM), that would have been a cooperative entity among the federal,
provincial  and  municipal  governments,  with  authority  for  planning,  managing  and
regulating transportation in the Greater Buenos Aires.
With  specific reference to  passenger rail  transport, initial  plans  envisioned the
ATAM with power to monitor and control the concession agreements, except for safety
issues which were to be regulated by National Commission for Rail Transport (CNTF).
Dispute resolution between concessionaires and the government were to be handled by the
National Commission for Rail Regulation (CNRF). Both the CNRF and the CNTF were
also to deal with inter-city passenger and freight railways. A 1993 decree established the
CNTF, but two attempts in 1992 and 1994 to create an arbitration body (i.e., CNRF) failed.
Although a preliminary institution (the so-called pre-ATAM) was created to  define and
develop the ATAM, the Congress could not pass the bill legalizing the ATAM, due to
political and institutional conflict.
The initial  regulatory  entity  for  the  metropolitan railway  concessions  was  the
Railway  Restructuring  Program  Coordination  Unit  (UCPRF,  within  the  Ministry  of
Economy,  Public  Works  and  Services), which  had  designed  and  overseen  the  entire
concessioning process. In this sense, no real regulatory framework was defined before the
concessions took place. In 1996, the UCPRF was merged with the regulatory body for bus
transport and the CNTF to form the National Commission for Transport Regulation
(CNRT), created by Decree 660/96, within the context of a wider public administration's
reorganization and restructuring process.
CNRT was born as a decentralized agency inside the environment of the Secretary
of Works and Public Services of the Ministry of Economy and Public Works and Services
but was later integrated in the Secretary of Transport, under direct control of the Ministry of
Economy.  CNRT's  main  functions  included  the  enforcement  of  laws  and  norms,
information collection  for  system  evaluation,  verification  of  contract fulfillment,  and
6sanction application. The CNRT cannot dictate regulations and the Ministry  effectively
retains  all responsibilities for changes in the  concession contracts and  for fare  setting
(including fare changes envisaged in the concession contracts). The CNRT ends up looking
like a three-legged workhorse - significant resources but no regulatory power - and with
limited vision - to the extent that since there is no real transport strategy, it is not to clear as
to where it is heading as a partner in the implementation of transport policy.
2.2  The objectives of regulation: what should CNRT do?
The Argentine case illustrates the difficult institutional transition that often accompanies
the reform of any traditionally state-controlled sector. Once private participation has been
introduced  in the  rail  sector The objectives of regulation should have  been explicitly
redefined to reflect the fact that they are supposed to reconcile the interests of the private
operators with those of consumers and users in general. 4
This redefinition of objectives was difficult because the  creation of  CNRT was
carried out amid a difficult political context that conditioned its  future development, its
functions and objectives. Although formally, CNRT is the main regulatory body in rail
transport at the moment, a review of its main mandates and competencies show that it has
no real regulatory functions. According to Decree 660/96, CNRT oversees and controls the
performance of freight and passengers transportation, by road and railway under national
jurisdiction. More specifically, these functions can be summarized as follows:
- to enforce laws and decrees regarding road and railway transport,
- to oversee road and railway transport companies' performance,
- to request the information and the necessary documentation to transport companies to
verify and evaluate the system performance, with the appropriate confidentiality of the
used information,
*  to control that the fares settled in the concession contracts are complied with and apply
the  sanctions  foreseen  in  the  legal  framework in  case  of  non-fulfillment  of  the
established conditions,
*  to  take the necessary steps in order to respond to passengers and user's  complaints
about the services, and;
*  to promote civil or penal actions in order to ensure the execution of its functions.
In particular, Decree 660/96, explicitly points out that CNRT has inspection and
control activities, but it does not assign explicitly regulatory responsibilities which in most
cases  with boil down to  the right to  resolve conflicts between players with  respect to
pricing  or  contract compliance  .De facto, the  Transport Secretariat takes  on that  role.
4 In this context,  Burns  and Estache  (1998)  suggest  that  the regulation  of newly  privatized  infrastructure  firms
as specified  in the mandate of regulatory  agencies  ends to have very similar  objectives  around  the world.
They  tend to identify  up to five  main regulatory  objectives:  protect  customers'  interests  regarding  prices and
quality  of service,  ensure  that  the business,  operating  efficiently,  can finance  its activities,  promote  efficiency,
fulfill  obligations  as decided  initially  by policymakers,  and  ensure  that  the regime  is sustainable  and  robust.
7CNRT's actions focus customer and community rights protection, competition promotion
in the sector under national jurisdiction, and the achievement of higher safety standards,
better operation, reliance, equity and widespread use  of the road  and railway transport
system.
Thus, when compared to the more general regulatory objectives usually expected
from a regulator, it is clear that CNRT's mission is short of what would be expected from a
regulator. Its objectives are mainly addressed to the protection of the consumer (in terms of
prices and quality) and of the system as a whole (technical standards, safety, etc.). The
viewpoint of the operator emerges only in as much as its interests are consistent with those
of the consumers and the sector. Moreover, the need of making regulation in a consistent
way with the financial and economic viability commitments made through the contract to
each operator has been left out of the CNRT's functions and is managed by the Transport
Secretariat.  As discussed below, this is the key issue in the current regulatory debate and
an  element  to  think  about  in  any  future  reform  of  the  system.  Assuming  that  the
government  decided  to  actually empower the  regulator with  a  full-fledged regulatory
responsibility - including the mandate to make fairer assessment of the viability of the
operators - the need to define relevant operational procedures is the next challenge CNRT
will have to face.
2.3.  The operational procedures and the processes: how should CNRT act?
In general terms, Argentina's rail concession contracts are not very different from those
found in other parts of the world in the sector. They cover prices, investment decisions,
service standards, technical quality and environmental quality. As suggested by Alexander
et al. (1999), to be able to monitor compliance in these functions, any regulator will have to
focus on some of the key aspects of the business covered by the contract with the private
company. In general, the main elements of each industry to be monitored can be classified
as operations, finance, transactions and services. Table 2.2 shows that for most of the key
functions of  a regulator,  information is a  necessary condition of their  effectiveness in
regulating.
Table  2.2.  Information  requirements  by  regulatory  functions
;: 0  0;;: f  uncloFr:  Opratlt0000004ra  Finnca  Trnstto  $ervke
Price  control  /  I  _
Technical  quahty  I  /
!$Non discminion  iR  p1ceing
Promfiotioni  of cmoomen  I  8
8In the case of Argentina, according to Decree 660/96, CNRT faces four primary
targets when collecting information from the rail sector. The information must be useful
for:
*  the instrumentation of the necessary mechanisms to guarantee the effective exercise of
its attributions regarding the operation of the road and railway transport system under
national jurisdiction,
*  the execution of the police power for activities under its competence in the transport
system, enforcing the laws, decrees and other regulations, as well as the enforcement of
concession contracts of the rail and subway services,
*  the control of the operating performance of rail concessionaires, and
the control, regarding railway security, of  the execution of the existing norrns referred
to tracks and fixed facilities, rolling stock and other materials and spares, as well as of
the works and provisions integrating the investments plans of the concessionaire.
In order to evaluate the suitability of these objectives, any consideration of the range
of information collected to meet these targets has to take into account the existing and
future regulatory functions. Furthermore, there is a trade-off between having information
regularly reported, with  potentially high  monitoring and compliance costs,  and having
agreed formats and definitions for information that can be requested when the need arises.
The assessment should establish whether the minimum amount of information necessary
for the day-to-day operation of the regulator is provided.
In terms of the four categories of information to be monitored, CNRT's experience
in information collection can be summarized as follows:
*  Operational information. It is provided on a monthly basis through direct contact with
the  concessionaires.  For the  commuter services, for  each  month  and  each  of  the
concessioned lines, CNRT monitors output data  in terms  of total  passengers, total
number of trains and car-kilometers. For each of the freight operators, the operational
information available each month to CNRT is the total output (in terms of total tons and
total tons-kms). For the intercity passenger services operated by the provinces, CNRT
obtains information on the total number of passengers. In general, the coverage of all
this operational data is adequate for the purposes of CNRT.
. Financial and  investment information. In the  case of  commuter services, where
prices  are  set  by  contract  and  revised  by  the  Secretary  of  Transport,  financial
information is related to operating information. CNRT requests annual audited balance
sheets and other accounting information from the concessionaires, but does not impose
specific  accounting procedures nor demands a  full detail  of  cost  assignment. The
revision of investments commitments is carried out on a monthly, project by project
basis, but unrelated to the overall financial and economic situation of the firm. With
respect  to  freight concessionaires, apart  from  the  same accounting information  as
above, CNRT obtains revenue data on a monthly basis, which allows it to  calculate
average tariffs. Investments are also reviewed project by project, in reference to the
commitments made in the concession contracts. None of the concessionaires is in the
9Stock Exchange, although their cost and financial information is audited every year. In
the case of intercity passenger services, CNRT has only general information provided
by the corresponding dedicated units in the provinces.
•  Transaction  information  includes  the  details  of  any  contracts  with  customers,
suppliers or employees, as well as special agreements with respect to certain facilities
(for example, port terminals or exclusive provision of services for mines). CNRT has a
limited access to this information which, so far has been seen as of little relevance, but
could be important in the future from the point of view of intermodal competition.
*  Service  information.  CNRT has  monthly accounts of the  incidences (in  terms  of
punctuality and regularity) of commuter and subway trains. It also elaborates periodical
customer satisfaction surveys. Since, according to the contracts, quality of service  is
linked to  price  reviews  in  the case  of  commuter services, CNRT  has  been  quite
effective in this. In the case of freight railways, detailed information regarding their
services is much less available to CNRT.
Following  the  eight  functions  described  in  Table  2.2.  Table  2.3  provides  a
summarized assessment of the relevance of the information collected by CNRT for most
standard regulatory needs. The quick assessment evaluates the procedures in data collection
and provides a quick diagnosis of some elements that should be considered in greater detail.
Table  2.3.  Information  collected  by  CNRT:  an  assessment
Funcion*  Evlute  of;000  ilo  Cprocdures  000 0 
Price  control  0  0  tf  Set  by  contracts.  CNRT  lacks  economic  mechanisms  for price Price control  ~~~~~reviews  or access  prices  setting
invesmentdecisions  Adequate  operational  information,  but  poor  cost  assignment
Investment  ~~~~~~control.  No  efficiency  measurement
Servicef  sandars0000;t  i  f;;.0t0;0;;  ;  < 0; ;;;;  Extensive  quality  in  commuter  services  but  poor  enforceability  of
Service standieds.  ~~~penalties
Technical  quality  Standards  set  in contracts.  Adequate  supervision  but lack  of
Environmental  qualit00  efficiency  measurement
Financial  viability  $:  ;  0 ;t  CNRT  lacks  a  financial  model  that  link  price,  quality  and investment  requirements  with  financial  viability
Non-discrmination  in  price  setting0  Prices  set  in  contracts,  but  insufficient  coverage  of  transaction Non-dsen'niniioh  t  'prie  Sdting  information
Irrelevant  for now from CNRT's viewpoint.  No major cases of
Promotion  of competition  captive  shippers  nor anti-competitive  practices.5
5 This is quite important where there are risks of cartelization which is quite important when few players are
involved, as is often the case in developing countries infrastructure sectors. In Argentina, as shown by Table
2.  1, only four consortia operate the seven commuter lines in Buenos Aires, whereas two of the private freight
concessionaires (BAP and MGU) are owned by the same company. Although, lack-of-competition risks are
not high at the moment, further concentration should not be discarded in the future, since the provisions for
the acquisition of cross-participations among the concessionaires are not very restrictive.
10Summarizing this analysis, there are broadly two applications for the information
collected by the regulatory agency: (i) as a means of monitoring the performance of the
company as spelled out in the contracts and (ii) to support occasional or periodic reviews
of specific activities or issues. CNRT can perfectly deliver on the first but it is not ready to
carry'  out the second one. Having information is only one part of the overall regulatory
information story. The key aspect is the ability to manipulate and use the information, and
reconcile the objectives of the regulatory agency with  its  function and  structure. That
overall internal consistency of the system is the most important and difficult piece of the
mechanism. The punch line is that CNRT's mandate and procedures are not as clear as in
other countries with respect to the financial viability In addition, non-discrimination pricing
rules and the commitrnent to competition are not included in the obligations imposed on the
private companies under contract with the government but are likely to be a concern of the
competition agency, if not of CNRT
2.4.  Identifying the pending issues
The current structure of rail regulation in Argentina needs a  fine tuning that clarify its
functions and correct some existing problems. Part of this need for additional regulatory
capacity is arising from the fact that most concession contracts proved to be incomplete in
terns  of the information requirements needed to anticipate investment problems. The two
specific  major  areas  where  development  and  new  work  is  more  necessary  include
objectives and procedures/processes.
*  With respect to objectives, it should be clear by now that regulation is something
more than simple operational and financial control. In contradiction with its name, the
National Commission for Transport Regulation, is and purely controlling agency with
a passive view of regulation. Information flows from the private operators to CNRT;
then, dates are scrutinized with respect to the contracts obligations and, in case of non-
fulfillment, penalties and sanctions are enacted. CNRT lacks the mechanisms to make
an active regulation, more consistent with the financial and economic viability of the
operators. CNRT, for example, makes no detailed analysis of the productivity of the
concessionaires, which could be crucial to conform their performance with the current
economic conditions under which they operate. CNRT also lacks instruments to revise
prices (for example, access prices) set  in the contracts, since its monitoring of the
operators costs is inadequate.
*  From the point of view of procedures, CNRT has access to  a large volume of
information, but  hardly exploits it in  a  comparative way.  As  some  other sectors/
countries have shown (for example, water or electricity) yardstick competition could
provide a  powerful  instrument to  make  comparisons among concessionaires, thus
improving the information mechanisms available to the regulator. However, a major,
out of CNRT control, obstacle lies here. Accounting information among the firms is
not homogeneous in terms of accounting or fiscal year. Moreover, accounting criteria
are  relatively  permissive  and  comparisons across private  concessionaries  are  not
automatic. If a complete regulatory accounting is to be set up, this should be one of the
issues to be addressed.
11The remaining parts of this document try to emphasize this diagnostic by providing
three  different  specific  examples  where  regulatory  accounting mechanisms  could  be
improved. The first one (Section 3) is a discussion of the methodology and the importance
of efficiency measurement. This is a currently underdeveloped area in CNRT's monitoring
of concession contracts. The second example, in Section 4, is a detailed study of the access
prices issue in the Argentine rail system, including a proposal to collect information needed
to  address this  issue. Section 5 is devoted to  the need of  a financial model for price
regulation and price revision, something that currently is out of the scope of CNRT, but that
could very important for future renegotiations.
3.  INFORMATION  FOR  EFFICIENCY  MEASUREMENT
Among the  specific responsibilities that  are indeed covered by the  decree that  creates
CNRT,  several  of  them  suggest quite  clearly - although only  implicitly - that  the
promotion of efficiency in various forms is one of its main obligations. 6 This includes the
responsibility to ensure that:
*  the interest of the current users are taken into account in the operator's "production"
decisions; in practice, this means that the regulator should check that the operators
minimize  the  cost  of  delivering their  services while meeting  all  their  contractual
obligations; in  more technical terms, it means that the regulators must monitor the
operator's  cost efficiency which combines allocative and technical efficiency that is
that inputs are used in their least cost-combination and that inputs are combined to get
the highest possible output;
*  the sector grows appropriately, that is that the right investment, technology  and
management choices are made to ensure that the future demand is met in a smooth way
and that service rationing does occur, also known as dynamic efficiency.
Implicitly, the decree says that for any period of observation, CNRT's performance
assessments must offer a balanced  view of the various sources of efficiency which is a
reasonable request on any regulatory agency. In Argentina, the need to control progress in
the performance of railways operators is particularly important as improvements are an
expected outcome of a switch from public operators which had grown to be known for their
poor productivity and user orientation. The control of performance improvements achieved
through the reforms must, at least to some extent, be quantitative if gains are to be shared
with users or losses with taxpayers in a fair and transparent way. The balanced view  of
performance needed by the regulators can be  approximated by  a  synthetic indicator of
efficiency changes over the specific period of observation which demands an  adequate
6  See Section 2 above. Decree No. 1996/660, of June 24, in particular Annex I where its responsibilities are
defined as protecting the rights of users, promoting competition in the markets for transport services and
ensure better safety, better operation, reliability, equity and generalized use of the motor and rail transport
systems for passengers and freight, as well as ensuring appropriate progress in all modes.
12regulatory data base.  CNRT has not yet worked on, such an  indicator. The rest of this
section suggests an action plan to adopt one.
3.1.  Picking a synthetic concept of efficiency to increase regulatory accountability
The  computation  of  a  number  of  basic  physical  and  financial  indicators  and  their
comparison with some best practice benchmark or with some average of all comparators -
typically the unit cost of an output measure such as the cost per ton-kilometer supplied, or
the  ratio  of  passenger-kilometers to  employees - has  so  far been  the  main  approach
followed by  CNRT. It  is  indeed the approach favored by many  traditional  regulators
because  these  partial  indicators  hey  are  simple  to  calculate,  easy-to-understand; and
generally widely accepted. However, they also have two significant disadvantages: they can
ignore the facts that rail operators tend to have multiple outputs and they wrongly assume
homogeneity between operators (rail operators are typically heterogeneous, i.e. differing
input and output mixes, customer size, type and densities, topography etc.).
The problem of heterogeneity can be dealt with at a simplistic level by grouping
comparable companies into broad categories (e.g., passengers and freights). However, such
an  approach requires a  large number of comparators, and the division into groups will
inevitably involve a large degree of arbitrariness. More sophisticated means of dealing
jointly with the problem of heterogeneity and multi-production involve the application of
statistical techniques to measure the total factor productivity of each operator.
The most common indicator used among the most effective regulators is the average
level of total factor productivity (TFP). 7 TFP is essentially the ratio of total output over
total inputs. The TFP of two firms facing the same operating environment (at one point in
time) can differ because of technical, allocative, dynamic or scale efficiency differences.
Since TFP can vary over time due to changes in these efficiencies, to technological or any
policy change that influences the operators' and user's incentives, it has enough flexibility
to be relevant to regulators in fluctuating economic environments as is the case for CNRT.
Information on TFP changes provides enough information on the total scope  for
performance improvements to ease CNRT's job in setting or resetting tariffs, subsidy levels
and service obligations accordingly in a transparent way. But this does not mean that they
can ignore the sources of TFP changes. It will often be crucial to be able to assess each
source of inefficiency separately. This is because the degree to  which an operator has
control over the various sources of inefficiency influences its performance and this may
7 In the UK, US and Australia, which are viewed by many as defining best practice in the field in particular in
the energy and telecom sectors, efficiency measurements are built into the regulatory regime as part of  the
price-cap design. It is also the case in the energy sector in Argentina.
s There is an extensive literature on the topic which suggests that the scope for efficiency improvements after
reform continues to be quite significant around the world; see for instance, Oum, Waters and Yu (1999), for
an  overview of methodologies and results, NERA (2000), focusing on the  efficiency of the  provision of
infrastructure  services and  Estache  et  al. (2000) for  an  overview of  econometric  issues and  results  on
efficiency measurements through stochastic frontiers.
13require regulatory actions. For instance, strategic uses by  an operator of this  ability to
control sources of inefficiency may result in anti-competitive behavior. On the other hand,
not all sources of potential efficient gains can be  controlled by the operators. Scale and
environment are often not controllable, and in some cases, allocative inefficiency may exist
for historical reason - e.g. long term employment or borrowing contracts - and can be slow
to  adjust. The upshot is that knowing what is going on at a fairly detailed level is the
normal business of the regulators and coming up with the information needed to make a
rigorous fair assessment is what is going on should be an immediate concern for CNRT.
In  Argentina's  railways  sector,  conflicts  and  trade-offs  between  the  various
regulatory  options have often been fueled by the fact that the regulators are less  well
informed than the operators about the costs and benefits of these options in terms of the
various  efficiency goals.  The  conflicts are  further fueled by  the  lack  of  rigor  of  the
"'watchdogs" - and most obviously the media who, lacking the benefit of rigorous neutral
regulatory  information,  often  tend  to  report  criticisms from  interest  groups  without
adequate analysis of their underlying hidden agenda and incentives. The lack of adequate
information is one of the reasons why regulation seems to end up striking an uncertain and
unstable balance between goals which never seem to satisfy anyone. Users think they pay
too much, operators argue they are paid too little and Governments feel that the residual bill
they often end up picking up is much too high - at least as high as the political cost of not
pleasing anyone.
3.2.  Measuring total factor productivity
Ultimately, if a regulator cannot raise the level of the discussion due to lack of transparent
analytical support to  its decision, it can only blame itself. This is why regulators across
sectors and countries are increasingly relying on indicators such as TFP. This is not to say
that TFP is perfect. All the techniques available tend to make assumption which are not
necessarily ideal for a country like Argentina. For instance, they often tend to assume that
firms operate in competitive output and input markets. The competition from the truckers
on  the  output  market  would  seem to  suggest  that  the  output  market  is  reasonably
competitive but it only applies to some of the profit centers for the operators. Similarly, the
credit  rationing  and  the  lack  of  a  long term  capital market  suggest that  competitive
conditions  are  not  that  great  on  the  input  side.  Ignoring  for  the  time-being  these
considerations and their consequences - because they can partially be addressed in the way
the inputs are measured as discussed later -, the next challenge is to pick a specific measure
to assess TFP. In deciding how to measure the TFP performance of its operators, CNRT
could pick between three broad types of analytically rigorous instruments - price-based
index numbers, non-parametric methods and parametric methods - whose advantages and
drawbacks are summarized in Table 3.1.
14Table  3.1. A comparison  of the main  approaches  to efficiency  and productivity  measurement
Dafta  Envelopment Analysis (DEA)  Stocbhssfc  Frontier  Anasl s ($FA)*  Price-based  Index  Numbers  (MIN)
.lnapormnmtowhhcnrcs  An econometric  method  which estimates a production or cost frontier of
A linear  programming  method  which  constructs  a  the form: y=f(x)+v-u, where v is a symmetric error term used to capture  Traditional  index  numbers  approach to  TFP
Desclnption  non-parametric  cost or production  frontier by fitting a  noise  and  u  is  a  one-sided error  term  used to  capture  technical  measurement. Prices are used as the weights.
piece-wise  linear  surface over  the data points  inefficiency.  A cost frontier (short run or long run) or distance function  Tornqvist or Fisher  formulae usually employed.
available  from each operator  for each period.  can alternatively  be used.
For a production  frontier or distance  function: quantity data on inputs and
Qattdaaon  inputs  and  outputs  for  a sample  of  outputs  for  a sample  of  firms  - ideally  over  a number  of  years.Quniyadpceatonnusadotusfr
DOte  nects  Quantity  data  - inputs  outr  a  sampleyof  For a long run cost  frontier: total costs, input  prices and output quantities.  Qti  an  prie  da  on  tiputsa
firms  idealy  ove a numer of  ears.For  a short  run cost  frontier:  variable  costs,  variable  input  prices,  fixed  too  oefrso  iepros
input quantities and output quantities.
Identifies  a set of peer firms (efficient  firms with
simiar  nputandoutpt  mxes foreac  ineficent  Attempts  to  account  for  noise. similar input and output mixes)  for each iefficient  Environmental  variables  easier to deal with.  Can do a study with only  two observations.
AdWntage$  firm.  Allows for the conduction  of traditional  statistical tests of hypotheses.  Reproducible  and transparent.
Can easily  handle multiple  outputs.  Easier  to identify outliers,  but cost frontier and distance  function can deal  Captures  allocative efficiency.
Does not assume  a functional  form for the frontier  or  with multiple  outputs.
a distributional  form for the inefficiency  error term.
Strongly influenced  by the degree  of imperfection  of  The decomposition  of the error term into noise and efficiency
the  information  used  components  may  be affected  by  the  particular  distributional  forms  Need  price  information.
Very'  sensitive  to choice  of  best  practice  standard  specified,  and  by  the  related  assumption  that  error  skewness  is an  Cannot  decompose TFP  measure  into
D>rewbacks  Traditional  hypothesis  tests are not possible.  caonema  ecye
Requires  large sample  size for robust esifates  - Requires  large sample  size for robust  estimates -which may not be  components.
which may not be available  early on in the life of a  available  early on in the life of a regulator.
._____  ._____ .___  regulator.
*  Ordinary  least  squares  (OLS)  estimation  of a frontier  can  be  viewed  as a special  case  of SFA,  where  one  assumes  that  there  is no  inefficiency.  Corrected  OLS
(COLS)  estimation,  where  the  OLS  intercept  is  shifted  so that  the  frontier  envelopes  all  data  points,  is  also  a special  case  of SFA,  where  one  assumes  that  there  is
no  noise.
Source:  Coelli,  Estache,  Perelman  and  Trujillo  (2001)
15The index number approach is the simplest and less demanding in terms of data and
this is why it is often popular among "new" regulators with modest data bases. Its main
drawback is that is its can only help in assessing the evolution of TFP. It cannot be used to
identify the sources of TFP changes. For most cases, it does however provide a useful order
of magnitude of what needs to be assessed. With M outputs (to build in the fact that the
operators may have multiple profit centers), with K inputs and with appropriate weights
attached to each output and input - most generally their prices - the TFP change from
period 0 to period I is defined as:
TFP,  /ITF  [  =ja,  mm  /Xk=l  bkXkl  am  Ym  >Ok=  bk  XkO
If prices are used as weight, which is the most common, the main question is to
decide whether to use the base of the end period prices. 9 The non-parametric approach
relies on mathematical programming techniques which doe not require a specification of
the  functional  form  of  the  best  possible  output  outcome  that  can  result  from  the
combination of input, also known as the production or cost frontier.  The standard non-
parametric approach is Data Envelopment Analysis or DEA. It is a deterministic approach
useful in assessing multiple output/multiple inputs activities and allows a disaggregation of
the sources of changes in TFP. The efficient firms are those for which there is no other firmr
or linear combination of firms which can produce more of each good/service with the given
set of inputs. Alternatively, there is no other firm or linear combination of firms which uses
fewer inputs for a given level of output. The main advantage of this approach is that it does
not require any a-priori assumption on the functional form and that  it generates useful
information with a relatively modest set of data. Its main disadvantage is that it requires
arbitrary decisions by the regulator on the sample size and the best practice benchmark.
Arbitrary  decisions  may  reflect  misunderstandings  of  the  regulatory  needs,  of  the
sector...or  of  the  technical  challenges stemming  from  the  methodological choice.  In
addition, since there is no assumed functional form, a large set of standard statistical tests
cannot be performed.
The parametric approach relies on econometric estimates of the determinants of the
frontier and of the sources of changes in TFP. There are three parametric approaches: the
stochastic parametric frontier (SPF), and the deterministic parametric frontier (DPF)
and the frontier obtained without assumptions with respect to inefficiency (FWA). In
all these approaches, efficiency is generally derived from an analysis of the wedge between
observed costs or outputs and those calculated from the econometric model. In other words,
they  are  implicitly or  explicitly  derived from  a  measure of  the  distance  between  the
observed firm and the closest firm on the frontier. With a DPF, all the firms are assumed to
9 Using the base period prices yields a TFP index which is the ratio of a Laspeyres output quantity index tc, a
Laspeyres input quantity index. Using period 1 prices yields Paasche indices. Both imply than inputs combine
into outputs in a linear production technology. A Fisher index is the geometric mean of these two indices and
implies an  underlying quadratic production technology, which is much more  sensible (i.e. more flexible),
from  an  economic viewpoint. A popular alternative is the  Tornqvist index, which  implies an  underlying
translog technology. The Fisher and Tornqvist indices often give identical results.share the same costs and production frontiers. The differences in the behavior of individual
firms and the frontier are attributed completely to inefficiency. It ignores the relevance of
any other factor not under the control of the firm (e.g. weather). This assumption may be
quite  reasonable  in  the  short run  when  all firms  have been  subject  to  an  equivalent
restructuring. But it many cases, it is not reasonable and the SPF and FWA are then the
preferred options.'0
In addition to having to pick a method, the regulator must also decide whether to
focus on production or on costs - i.e., on physical or  financial concepts. Whether the
frontier is estimated for cost or production depends upon the type of sources of inefficiency
that needs to be assessed. If allocative or cost efficiency are of concern and the information
on prices is important, a cost frontier should be the main focus since it gives the total cost
of production as a function of total quantity of output and of the factor prices. Production
frontiers are, however, often preferred as they require less data on inputs and outputs which
are easier to obtain than the information needed for cost frontiers. Their main drawback is
that they only generate information on technical efficiency. Their main advantage is that
they do not require information on input prices.
3.3.  How the data availability drives the choice of methodology
While an element of arbitrariness remains under all these techniques, ultimately, the choice
between the various approaches is driven by the assumptions the regulators can live with
and the quality and volume of data available. So far CNRT has issued few guidelines to
generate the information it needs to comply strictly with its obligations as a regulator. In
particular, it does not have a good ability to control the commitments made by the operators
in  terms  of  technical,  allocative and  dynamic  efficiency through  parametric  methods
because its does not have enough comparable data yet to generate fully reliable information
on each operator. The data bases available are incomplete - even considering that for many
of the data series available monthly data is available and could generate of volume of
information large enough to measure some of the efficiency concepts. It could rely on non-
parametric methods, but here also, the data base available is incomplete. Moreover there is
no  comparable  data  on  what  could be  viewed  as  a  good  benchmark  to  which  the
Argentinean operators could be compared. The best bet would be to look at what happened
in Australia and Japan where the rail market structure may be closest to the one observed in
Argentina and where some reasonably comparable information is available. For now the
most realistic approach to assess TFP changes for each operator  is to follow the simplest of
these more rigorous approaches and to apply standard index number analysis to efficiency
measurements.
For the near future, it makes sense for  CNRT to  follow  the lead  of ENRE  or
ENARGAS and to start getting organized to generate the information it will need in most
10 More recently, researchers  have started to rely as well on distance function to assess the physical
performance  of an operator because they do not require an assessment  of efficiency  under optimizing
conditions  which  may be quite  useful  when  assessing  the short  run performance  of a rail operator  where quasi
fix inputs raise many issues of optiTnal  capacity. See Coelli and Perelman  (2000), for one of the first
applications.
17interactions with the operators from tariff resetting to renegotiations. A production function
requires data measured in physical or monetary terms on production, employment, capital
and intermediate inputs. A cost function requires data on total or average production costs
(including the opportunity cost of capital), on the production level and on labor, capital and
intermediate inputs prices. In practice, this can be quite demanding. Most regulators would
assume they have the necessary information and so did CNRT until very recently. The
reality is somewhat more subtle but cannot be fully assessed with a detailed diagnosis of
the situation which would assess the type of data available and its quality against some best
practice benchmark. Table 3.2 summarizes the kind of information a rail regulator would
need to measure TFP changes and its sources as rigorously as possible.  ' I
Table  3.2: Minimum  Ideal  Data  Requirements  for each  operator
lnterqed*aeyer  Lts
Non-financial  data
Total  Length  of line (in km)  _  _
Length  of  electrified  line (in km)  _  _
Tons  of Freight  transported  _  _
Thousands  of passengers  _  _
Trains-kilometer  _  _
Number  of administrative  workers  _  _
Number  of  operational  workers  _  _
Number  of locomotives
Number  of  wagons
Number  of  coaches
Energy  consumption
Financial  data  for each  cost  center  for each  operator
Fixed  Assets  Valuation  _  _
Past accumulated amortization or remaining life  - - -
Annual  Amortization  _  _
Economic  Depreciation  _  _
Wage  costs  per  category  of workers  _  _
Social  Security  costs  _  _
Other  Workers  compensations  _  _
Energy  costs  _  _  _
Total  taxes  _  _  _
Administrative  costs  _  _
Other  costs  _  _
Subcontracting  costs  _  _
Infrastructure  levies  _  _
Financial  costs  _  _
Dividends  _  _
Debt/equity ratio and debt/equity levels  ___
Total  costs  - _
t  For a longer discussion of measurement problems in the context of a regulated industry, see Coelli, Estache,
Perelman and Trujillo (2001).
18The first part of Table  3.2 focuses on the physical data needed to  assess the a
production function if this is what CNRT wishes to do. It has a strong overlap with the
partial  performance indicators commonly used  in  engineering publication and  is  more
readily available than the data needed to assess a cost efficiency. For most of its operators,
CNRT knows about the infrastructure, rolling stocks and traffic volumes. However, it has
only partial information on employment levels - it sometimes knows the total levels but not
the composition per skill types and it does generally not know about temporary workers and
the labor inputs of subcontracted activities. It has very little information on intermediate
inputs,  most  importantly  .energy consumption. The upshot  is that  the  simplest of  the
frontiers is already likely to be a challenge and require some heroic assumptions under the
current state of information.
The second part of Table 3.2 is more directly relevant to the estimation of a cost
frontier  -which  would  be  needed  to  assess the  relevance of  allocative  efficiency.  It
demands detailed data on the various costs related to capital, labor and other unrelated
costs. It seems to  have a strong overlap with  financial accounting data but this  can be
misleading. In practice, because financial accounts seldom meet the norms needed by a
regulator.  Standard  cost  accounting,  for  instance,  may  not  have  the  degree  of
disaggregation a regulator needs to  be able to allocate every type of costs across profit
centers strictly enough to make a fair assessment of production or cost efficiency. This is
why CNRT's ability to comply with its terms of references as a regulator as described in its
statutes will depend on its commitment and ability to generate regulatory accounts and to
impose cost allocation rules sufficient fair and conceptually reasonable to calculate TFP
and its main components.
3.4.  From financial to regulatory accounting and other information needs
As CNRT takes own its need to develop a regulatory accounting system to address routine
needs and comply with its statutes, it needs to organize its task around a set of principles
against which its options can be assessed. In general - but in particular when it comes to
assessing TFP - the information its regulatory accounts will generate needs to be:
*  Reliable: it is essential for information to be as reliable as possible to ensure that all
meaningful applications of any  efficiency measurement techniques; this  requires
clear definition for each indicator and the ability to apply standard audit tests to any
set of data for any regulatory purpose; for instance, the definition of salary costs
must clearly spell out all the taxes and other social obligations paid by employers
and employee; similarly, the definition of asset life, of amortization rules or of the
terms of asset valuation must be clearly explained if the contribution of capital to
production is to be assessed in any reasonable way
*  Comprehensive: it is just as important for the regulators to understand the business
of the operators and to obtain accounts that are detailed enough to the separation of
the cost  structure into the various components of the  business - the separation
between regulated and unregulated activities is the most crucial but the ability to
check on reallocation possibilities between operational and capital expenditures is
also important -;  each activity is a cost center and insufficient details or unclear
19allocation rules on what accrues to each center can lead to significant distortions in
the measurement of efficiency;
*  Consistent over time: the ability to monitor the absolute evolution of the operator
costs and income sources over time is essential to the ability to generate any type of
measure of efficiency gains; while two points in time are sufficient, the longer the
series  of  years  available, the  longer the  menu  of  technical  options  available;
consistency over time requires a guarantee that whatever definition is chosen at the
beginning of the reform process, it is only changed exceptionally;
*  Consistent across operators: since in most cases, the historical information will be
limited to a few years only, many regulators will be interested in the possibility of
comparing the relative performance across operators; this can only be done if all
operators follow the same guidelines for reliability and comprehensiveness and that
the indicators selected are all measured at the same point in time across operators.
These objectives can be achieved by CNRT through the imposition of standardized
regulatory  accounts  which  specify cost  disaggregation levels,  measurement  rules  and
definition rules  for  each regulated account  and  calculation and  allocation  rules  when
subjective interpretations are possible to the detriment of certain users. The natural place to
start  to  generate  this  set  of  regulatory  accounts  sufficiently  detailed  to  allow  the
measurement of the efficiency performance is to check the quality of the accounting data
available.
In  most  countries,  railways operators, as  with  any  other  firm, are  required  to
produce annual balances which are expected to generate a common set and'standardized set
of  data to assess the absolute (over time) and relative (across operators) performance of the
concessionaires. This  is  not strictly possible  in  Argentina. The  accounting year varies
across firm and the  accounting data generated for fiscal purposes is  confidential. This
means that until CNRT has been able to impose a common timing for regulatory accounts
inter-operator comparison will be limited to the comparison allowed by data available on a
monthly  basis which can then be  annualized. Only a modest subset of the raw data  is
available on a  monthly basis and hence access to relevant comparisons will be  limited.
CNRT should however be able to at least track down the evolution of the performance of
each operator individually if the accounting information is reliable, comprehensive enough
and consistent over time.
The  transformation of existing  financial data into  regulatory data  will  demand
adjustments even for inter-temporal comparisons of specific operators. This  should not
cause significant trouble and could be negotiated with the operators if clear and consistent
rules are defined and imposed across the board. The specific information needs may be best
discussed for each one of the key variables - outputs and inputs - independently. This data,
as summarized in Table 3.2, is of course only useful if the underlying technical elements
and the constraints they impose are well assimilated in the analysis.
Physical production is seldom available from accounting data. But since it is not
uncomnmon  for operators to have multiple outputs, it is important for regulatory accounts to
20recognize this explicitly and ensure that the various business units are separated in the
regulatory accounts as separate profit and costs centers. In rail, the most common business
lines separation are passengers vs. freight but an important potential business can be the
provision of infrastructure services to other carriers. This separation is quite handy when
the regulator needs to assess cost efficiency. It is also important for cases in which  no
physical units are available. The provision of infrastructure services or any other type of
services cannot always be  expressed in physical terms and hence revenue expressed  in
constant terms is a good approximation. If the accounts are separated, the main challenge
left is to find a reasonable deflator-which can be a major headache when consistency across
operators is needed and service mix vary significantly across operators. In practice, most
analysts focus on physical measures of the core business (such as tons or passengers-kin),
ignoring non-core businesses, and hence overestimating costs and input requirements.
The information on inputs needed to measure TFP is generally also only partially
satisfied  by  the  accounting  system.  Most  analytical  instruments  require  separate
information on labor, capital - which can be separated between fixed, i.e. km of lines and
variable or quasi fixed, i.e. rolling stocks and locomotives - and "other inputs".  "Other
inputs"  is a  catch-all  category and  is often defined in  some constant price  value.  Its
composition must however be well understood by the analysts and hence a request for
accounting details may be a good idea when it represents over 10-15% of the total cost. For
instance, when subcontracting of some contractual obligations is important, it is likely to be
an important component of this catch-all category and it may be misleading to ignore it.
Indeed,  its  is  important  for  the  regulator  to  understand the  coverage  of  the
subcontracting and its allocation across cost centers. Unfortunately, unless the regulator
requests the information for each business unit, the operators are unlikely to provide. Many
analysts prefer to focus on only the main intermediate input, i.e. energy consumption, to
simplify matters. Others take this category to be a residual category which reflects whatever
is not labor or capital input. But here also it may be important to understand every category
to  avoid  double counting. A  common mistake  is to  include financial  expenditures  in
intermediate inputs when they are already reflected in the economically correct definition
of the cost of capital discussed below.
The labor input is typically the easiest to derive from standard information. While
operators are sometimes reluctant to  release too  specific information on the number of
workers allocated to each cost center because they see it as commercial information, they
are often willing to provide an aggregate figure which, in expressed in constant prices, are
useful  approximations of  labor inputs. Moreover, this  information can also  be  used to
compute  average wages paid by each operators which may be needed for  some of the
approaches to TFP measure. In addition, it is sometimes possible to  obtain salary scales
from the  operators, separating at least between blue and  while collars. The degree  of
homogeneity  of  the  labor  force and  of the  payments  mode  (low  employment, many
temporary and large overtime vs. high employment, low temporary and low overtime) is
21likely  to  be important in  assessing the relative contribution of the labor factor and  its
average costs. However, rough approximations are often sufficient. 2
The capital input is the most challenging one. Its treatment is still arbitrary and
subject to many debates. Part of the debate reflects a confusion on the multiple concepts.
The  "capital" production factor is the quantity of capital needed to produce  a  specific
service level. The capital cost or expenditure is what the operator spends of the "capital
factor". The cost of capital is the price of a unit of capital. All three concepts can come in
handy to measure efficiency. The first one is hard to obtain as capital is not a homogeneous
factor. The physical units of the first part of Table 3.2 can be useful in this respect but may
not  be  comprehensive enough. The most common comprehensive approximation comes
from  asset  valuation  which  should have been  assessed during  the  preparation  of  the
concessions and which can be complemented with investment flows. It provides the basis
for most regulatory decisions and in particular for the design of tariffs as well as for the
calculation of capital costs and of the cost of capital. It is also at the core of the business
value of any of the concessions and should hence have been reflected in the business plans.
It can also help significantly in the construction of the capital flow variable needed for most
TFP measures. If asset value has not been done at all or properly at the beginning of the
process, using undepreciated replacement values as a proxy for capital quantity may be the
easiest - yet not easy - solution.
The next challenge is to come up with an economically sensible rule to assign the
share of the asset value that corresponds to the annual service flow. Many analysts assume
a  linear  depreciation  rule over  the  economic lifetime time  of  the asset  which  is  not
necessarily what  the accounting depreciation rules reflect.  The backup used  by  many
analysts is to simply use the accounting depreciation data as is, trying to relate as much as
possible to each cost center. The main problem with this approach is that it ignores the
opportunity cost of capital. Calculated as the annual revenue from a placement of the assets
in  US  bonds, the  opportunity cost  of  capital  can be  added to  the  annual  accounting
depreciation to  obtain an approximation of the an  economic capital cost.  The price  of
capital is ideally based on the weighted average financing cost of capital (WACC) (see
Section 5 below) of which financial costs and dividends are often the main components,.
but can also be approximated by the ratio of the economic capital cost to the asset value.
3.5.  Measuring efficiency as a sign of good and fair governance
A good reason to try to  assess the TFP performance of the operators is to  increase the
fairness of the regulatory process. Efficiency performance can be assessed in various ways
as discussed above and these methods are clearly to some extent arbitrary as each one
embodies different sets of assumptions and restrictions. But by getting all players to agree
on a specific method, in an open discussion of the choice, the regulators create clear and
12 Average  wages  obtained  by dividing  the wage bill by the number  of workers  can be misleading  when the
composition  of activities  varies across  operators.  For an operator  subcontracting  most low skilled  jobs, the
average  wage calculated  from standard  accounting  information  will be higher  than for operators  with many
low  skilled  workers  on the payroll.
22transparent rules of decisions. Estimating a relatively simple synthetic benchmark indicator
of potential efficiency achievements against which the compliance of each operator can be
checked provides  a logic to  regulatory assessments. In addition, the data requirements
imposed by  these methods can also be  used to  generate new regulatory tools  such  as
yardstick competition which allows the comparison of the performance of an operator with
that of all others. But this, of course, requires reliable, comprehensive and consistent data,
which may be the most pressing challenge CNRT is facing.
4.  INFORMATION  FOR ACCESS PRICES
The second regulatory issues for which information and accounting rules are essential is the
pricing of the access to share facilities. It is one of the most contentious regulatory issues.
The  problem  is  particularly  relevant  in  industries where the  network  owner  remains
vertically integrated with the service provider, as in Argentina railways because it may
imply competition effects as well as efficiency issues. Given that regulators have wider
objectives  when  setting  access  prices  and  have  different  levels  of  information,  the
approaches used by different countries vary markedly.
In Argentina, many parties - including the CNRT and  most operators - do not
consider access a first-order problem in the rail industry for now. This is spite of the fact
that under the terms of the concession agreements, freight concessionaires were required to
allow passenger trains to operate over their tracks in return for a toll or peaje. In particular,
the level of the peaje was an explicit element in the bid evaluation and revenues from track
access fees built-in the concessionaires' business plans. It is also surprising because access
tolls  have  remained  unpaid  since  1996 by  intercity  train  operators  on  the  basis  of
insufficient  investment  improvements.  Some  concessionaires,  such  as  Ferroexpreso
Pampeano (FEPSA),  with  a relatively  weak financial position and  a  large  number of
intercity passenger services running on its tracks, could greatly benefit from an agreement.
Therefore, the questions addressed in this section are: is CNRT ready to intervene in this
dispute?  Could  it  set  revised  access  prices  that  take  into  account  actual  levels  of
investment? In addition, access issues in the commuter lines in Buenos Aires could become
worse in the future. If clear rules for accessing to the ports are not clearly developed, the
intermodal distribution of traffic achieved could end up being less than optimal results, only
because the lack of prevision from the regulatory point of view. Although the remaining of
this section is mainly devoted to access prices in the freight concessionaires' lines, it may
be worth pointing out that a similar problem might arise in the ports.
4.1.  Access prices in Argentina's railways
After  the disintegration  of Ferrocarriles Argentinos into three  business units  and  the
concessioning to private  operators of freight services, the initial passenger track access
rules were agreed upon between the concessionaires and the federal operator of passenger
services  (FEMESA).  When  intercity  services  were  transferred  to  the  provincial
Governments, the  contracted  access  fees  were  negotiated  downwards,  but  provincial
Govermments have generally refused to make their payments, even while continuing to
23operate trains  and in  fact, some provincial rail units appear to  be planning  even more
passenger services, presumably while continuing non-payment of their access fees.
Table  4.1.  Access  prices  by  type  of  owner  and  user  (USS  per  train-km)
I  Track  owner  :  0  00 :00  f0  0707007;f 
Tr  mcke  owner  iFreight  operaor  lCommuter  operator
Track  user
$1210
Inerity  opeiratorf  $2.50$12
::.50  :  :  ::W  (only in the Buenos Aires area)
Trackage and access rights bilaterally  $4.50 (4:00 am-10:00 pm)
Freight operator  negotiated  (example,  $4.00  in rural
lines  and  $6.00  in urban  lines)  $1 10 (10:01  pm-3:59  am)
* Ownership refers to exploitation, since legal ownership remains in the hands of the state not the concessionaires'.
Table 4.1 summarizes the situation of access prices in Argentina today according to
the concession agreements. Since the commuter operators always run trains on their own
tracks they have not been included in the rows. The intercity passenger operators are not
included in the columns because their infrastructure is not used by any other operator. As it
can  be  seen,  the  official  toll  set  for  intercity passenger  services running  on  freight
concessionaires' tracks was $2.50 per train-kilometer, irrespective of other details (such as
type of line or traffic). Ferrobaires, the intercity passenger operator in the province cf
Buenos Aires has also an access fee of $1.20 per train-kilometer to the commuter operators'
track. With respect to the freight operators, their access to other freight operators' tracks is
bilaterally negotiated, as well as trackage rights. This negotiation depends on the type of
line used and, as an example provided by a concessionaire, they could be around $4.00-
$6.00  for  rural and  urban  lines respectively. Access to  commuter tracks is  set  in  the
concession contracts at $4.50 per train-kilometer during peak hours and $1.10 during the
night. Access slots are managed by commuter concessionaires.
In general, the access tolls paid by freight concessionaires among themselves and
those paid to commuter trains operators are working in an adequate way. The real problem
lies in the access prices set to intercity passenger services for accessing to freight operator's
tracks.  The  provincial  Governments with  dedicated rail  units  claim  that  the tolls  are
unrepresentative  of  the  service  provided.  If  concessionaires  do  not  carry  out  their
investment  commitments,  passenger  services will  be  limited  (in  terrns  of  speed,  for
example). This  makes it difficult for them to  attract more passengers and therefore  to
increase their revenues and improve their weak financial position. On the other hand, the
amount due to the freight operators from the passenger train operators with respect to past
access  is  estimated at  about $40 million including interests. If  a  renegotiation of  the
concession agreements will result in a resolution of the mutual claims between the rail
concessionaires and the Federal Government, then serious consideration should be given to
resolving the claims of the freight operators against the provincial Government at the same
time.
244.2.  The economics of access charges: a quick reminder
The basic economic principles for the efficient use of rail infrastructure is that,  in the
absence of capacity constraints, operators willing to pay the extra costs they impose by
their use of the infrastructure should be  allowed to use  it. In the presence of capacity
constraints the capacity should go to the operator and type of traffic for which it has the
highest value. This approach to pricing has essentially been labeled by economists as short-
run marginal cost pricing;  in  other words charging the incremental cost  of use  of the
existing infrastructure by the train concerned. 13 This simple  incremental  cost pricing  rule
takes into account both the competition effect (in the downstream market) and would cover
the wear and tear cost, plus any costs imposed on other services in terms of delays or
retiming to accommodate the train concerned. In the presence of a capacity constraint, this
cost would have added to it the value of any train which could not be run as a result of lack
of capacity.1 4
However, this approach often neglects the other side of access prices: cost coverage.
The most relevant economic characteristic of railways is that a large proportion of the total
cost of providing rail infrastructure is fixed, in the sense that additional traffic imposes
relatively low additional costs to the system as a whole, in the absence of congestion or
disruption to existing traffic. In practice, these cost characteristics mean that average costs
decline as traffic levels increase, since fixed costs can be spread over a greater volume of
traffic. Accordingly, pricing on the basis of incremental costs may result in  traffic that
cannot cover its average costs, being priced off the network: setting access charges on an
incremental cost basis would result in the infrastructure provider failing to  get enough
revenues. Consequently, access charges cannot be determined on the basis of incremental
costs  alone.  Box  1  summarizes  the  two  most  prominent  theoretical  frameworks  to
addressing this  access pricing problem in  vertically integrated markets.  These are the
Ramsey pricing approach and the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR).
13 The term incremental cost of a service (for example, the use of infrastructure, in the case of access)  is used
to refer to the cost per unit of service  necessary  to provide  the entire service,  or the cost avoided  by not
providing the service,  given all the other services supplied.  In this second sense it is also referred  to as
"avoidable  cost".
14 This  concept  is often  contrasted  with  that of long  run marginal  cost,  which  represents  the additional  cost of
an extra train when  the infrastructure  is optimally  adapted  to the demand  in question.  It is well  known  that if
the infrastructure  were optimally  configured,  the two  concepts  would  give  the same  resulting  value,  since  the
infrastructure  would  be improved  to the point  at which  the cost of the extra  capacity  exactly  matched  its value
in terms of relieving  congestion  and permitting  additional  trains  to run. The general  perception  that short run
marginal cost is below long run is only true in the presence  of excess capacity;  the reverse is true when
capacity  is scarce. Since no  major infrastructure improvements are being  considered in Argentina at the
moment, we will not proceed further in this line of analysis.
25BOX 1: Ramsey pricing vs. ECPR
A first general approach  to efficient  access  pricing under a break-even  constraint  for the infirastructu provider  is
Ramsey  pricing.  Consider  the :usual  example  of a vertically  integratd rail company  that offers services  connecting
towns  J and B as well as B and C.  AB is the bottleieck,  over which  the incumbent  M has  a monopoly.  However,BC  is a
co  ipetitive  route in which  Mand  a rval fim R can  compete.  The  queston then arises  as to howM  should  set an access
charge  a to enableR  to offer a service  along  the routeAB.  In terms  of the Argentine  cse,  this could  be  aiso interpreted
as B being the Buenos  Aires port for example,  and the contentious  routeRS  is one of the commuter  passenger  lines.
Alternmtively,  and very broadly  interprt4AB  could  be a congested  segment  in any of the freight  concessionaires'
routes  affected  by intercity  passenger  traim.
In any of thest cases,  if Ad's  final  retail price  for the entire servke  ABC is p, the firm's  marginal  cost of granting
access  to AB is  c and its m  inal cost of the downstream  activity  isd,  .Ads  total narginal cost of providing  the service
ABC  is c+d. Assume  also that  Md  ineurs  a fixed  cost F that is  joint to both  AB and  BC. Because  there are  joint costs,  the
marginal  costs  c and  d are incremental  as well as marginal.  If rival downstrm suppliers  are assumed  to have  constant
returns  to scale, and  produce  a final product  that is in some way  differentiated  from that offe=ed  by the incumbenW,
then the optimal  access  price  will  be of the form:  a* = e + Ramey ter  where  the Ramsey  term takes  account  of both
own-price  and cross-price  elasticities  of dermand.  The approach  is related  to sensitivities  in demand  more than it is to
costs.  As such,  it does not guarantee  least-cost  production.  The  approach  also requires  extensive  demand  information  on
the part of the regulator  for the purpose of setting prices.  However,  if the network provider  were allowed some
discretion  to set its own prices  within  some  overall  basket,  then this may help to alleviate  both of these problems.  The
standard  Ramsey  term would  jutit  raising  price  above  marginal  cost in inverse  proportion  to the elasticity  of demand
for the servie in question.  However,  it would  be difficult  to do this in a fixed  tariff  for more  than a limited  number  of
categories  of tain.  Much finer differentiation  would he possible if individual  negotiations  between  infrastructure
provider  and train operator  were  pertnitted
Given  the practical  issues that arise  from the Ramsey  mechanism,  a popular  altemative  to the problem  of setting
access  pnces  with a focus on competition  and cost coverage  is the efficient  component  pricing rile. The entrant  who
comes  in on a small scale should  be charged  marginal  social cost plus whatever  contribution  to the fixed charge  the
existing  operator  loses  as a result  of the  new  enty. Under  the ECPR,  the  infrastructure  owner  is permitted  to chage an
access  prie equal to the direct  incremental  cost of supplying  the additional  unit, plus the incremental  opportunity  cost
of providing  that access.  This  opportunity  cost component  is the profit forgone  by the network  owner  from not selling
the entire  product  downstream  itself To illustrate  this principle,  assume  tt  the indirect  opportunity  cost ofw  granting
R access  to the route  AB is the price  mark-up  thatM  could  have made  over  its total incremental  costsc+d.  Hence,  since
the direct  incrmental cost of providing  access  ise, whe  ECPR  states  that the optimal  access  charge  a* should  be of the
form:  a* -c+  fp- (c+ &J.  This  equaton may  be simplified  to give the 'margin  rule',such that the difference  between
Ms  retail and access prices is eawl to the incrment  a  cost of ihe downstream  activity,  that is,p - a* - d  The
advantage  of using the ECPR is that, since  it is cost based,  it does not require detailed  information  on demand.  It also
ensures  minimum  cost production,  since a higher  access charge  would deter more efficient  rivals,  whereas a lower
access charge  would invite  excessive  entry.  However,  the ECPR has been  criticized  by a number  of authors,  on the
grounds  that it may  be overly  protective  of incumbents,  thus  pteserving  monopoly  rents.
4.3.  Regulatory  accounting  procedures  for setting access  prices
When, as in Argentina, downstream competition is not a major issue, setting access prices
is relatively easier although the economic principles outlined above still apply. The rule that
arises from the Ramsey mechanism or the ECPR mechanism is simply to  set the access
charge equal to  the  incremental costs associated to  passenger  trains plus  an  adequate
proportion of indirect and general costs. Yet, although the recipe is easy in words, it is not
in practice, since it requires a tremendous work of cost identification (direct costs) and cost
allocation (indirect costs).
4.3.1.  Identifying  the relevant  direct  costs
The  operation of passenger trains over  the lines of the freight concessionaires usually
imposes several direct costs. These costs are relatively easy to identify and be grouped into
three main categories:
*  Incremental costs of new track. Passenger trains require higher quality standards in
the tracks than freight trains. For technical and safety reasons, any new track that would
26be used for passenger services should include these enhancements and would therefore
be more costly for the provider. In addition, running passenger trains could also affect
the  number  of  crossing protections that  must  be  built  and  maintained  in  densely
populated areas. The same is true for switches, fueling stations, and all other fixed plant
investment. In the case of Argentina, since no major new track constructions have been
planned, this cost should be interpreted in terms of rehabilitation.
*  Incremental operating costs. Freight trains operating costs may increase as a result
of passenger services if there are capacity constraints. For example, a full siding is
necessary if  one  freight  train  meets  one  passenger  train  coming  in  the  opposite
direction. These costs are relatively less important in the Argentine case, since few
tracks are used at full capacity. However, if any passenger train has an accident that
creates a bottleneck, any benefit associated to cargo trains no longer running on time
should be imputed to the passenger traffic.
*  Incremental  costs  of  maintenance.  Deterioration  increases  when  freight  and
passenger trains run on  the same lines. At  the moment, only  incremental costs of
maintenance seem relatively important in Argentina, although they are related to the
level of quality of that maintenance. If the freight concessionaire is not obligated to
maintain its lines at a higher level than it needs for its freight operation and if the freight
concessionaire had adequate track capacity available, the operation of a limited number
of passenger trains would only impose a modest incremental cost.
All the direct costs associated to the operation of passenger trains over the freight
concessionaires'  tracks  should be  identified  and  included  within  one  of  the  former
categories. This  requires must  have  an  adequate costing  mechanism that  should  be
embedded in the overall procedures of the regulatory accounting.
4.3.2.  Allocatingfixed  and common costs
In addition to costs that are directly attributable, a passenger service may also be assigned a
reasonable portion of those costs of the freight operator which cannot be clearly associated
with any one  service. The presence of substantial economies of scale and scope in the
railroad industry creates a number of problems for this allocation and, in fact, it should be
reckoned that it is impossible to allocate, in any non-arbitrary way, a share of fixed and
comnuon costs to  any particular railroad activity.' 5 There is simply no way to subdivide
15  A fixed cost is one that is necessary to provide a service or group of services, but whose magnitude does not
vary with  changes  in  the quantity  of a service  that is planned  to be or that  is in fact  provided.  For example,  if a
railroad is to run between A and B, there is a minimum outlay on track and roadbed that must be  incurred,
even if the trains run virtually empty. The service can be discontinued altogether; but even in the longest of
long runs, its roadbed cost cannot be reduced to a negligible level if the amount of the  service is to  be
positive. Also, a loading facility may be necessary to transport coal efficiently between points A and B, but its
cost may be unchanged if the amount of coal transported is doubled or halved. Common costs are often fixed
(e.g., the basic portion of the outlays on track and way and structures between A and B may be both fixed and
common costs).
27those costs in a mechanical fashion that is unique and has any foundation in economic
logic.
In  practice, regulatory authorities historically have determined tariffs (including
access fees) based on the so-called fully distributed (or allocated) costs mechanism, or
FDC.  Under this  method regulators do (somehow) allocate  shared production costs  to
individual services. Each service is then required to generate revenues which will cover all
the costs associated with that service. Although it is often argued that there is no sound
economic rationale for  fully distributed cost pricing, this practice obviously  does have
economic consequences.
Traditionally, regulatory proceedings have focused on three types of FDC rules. The
first is the distribution of shared costs on the basis of a common measure of utilization,
such as gross ton-miles. Under this FDC approach, which is termed the relative output
method, shared costs are allocated in proportion to the number of units of output of each
service. A second approach sometimes used is the allocation of shared costs in proportion
to  the costs that can be directly attributed to the various services. This attributable cost
method has also been traditionally used by many unregulated firms in their allocation cf
overhead costs. A third scheme requires allocation of shared costs in proportion to the gross
revenues generated by each service. This gross revenue approach, has been frequently used
to allocate overhead costs between freight and passenger services.
Any of these  three  methods or  any  of their  many variations  could be  equally
acceptable for allocating a substantial part of the indirect costs. The real issue however,
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  regulatory  authority  is  to  outline  a  clear  and  non-
discriminatory mechanism open to the concessionaires and track users. To do this, as in the
case of direct costs, some procedures should be established in the regulatory accounting.
4.3.3.  Access pricesfrom  a regulatory  perspective
According to the analysis carried out so far - and consistently with the results of Section 2
- it seems obvious that CNRT is not prepared at the moment to identify the direct costs
imposed by passenger services to freight concessions. In addition, it does not have clear
criteria to  allocate common costs to  different types of traffic.  Therefore establishing a
process to address in detail the access pricing question would impose a high cost on both
the regulator and the companies and several information needs the freight concessionaires
may not be in position to face. These information improvements should be needed on the
following areas from the freight concessionaires: operational information on a line-by-line
basis (particularly on those lines shared with passenger trains); detailed asset inventories
and valuation information; and informnation  on the use of shared assets.
Table 4.2 outlines the general methodology for establishing access tariffs along the
theoretical and practical lines described above. The next section illustrates how this works
out in practice. However, an outstanding issue is that there is no unique solution, rather
there is a range of values for the tariff, depending on the definition of some of the cost
items and the approach adopted for cost allocation. A decision needs to  be taken as to
whether the regulator will determine the appropriate price or set the boundaries that then
28allow negotiations between the provincial governments and the freight operator. If the latter
approach is adopted, there is a need to have a final appeal to CNRT if the two sides still
cannot determine an appropriate price within the boundaries that have been set.
Table  4.2.  Methodology  for establishing  access  prices  for passenger  trains
AnO'  Conmment
Step  1. Identification  of costs  directly  attributable  to the  passenger  This is  the  basic  operating  information
trains;  and  other  costs incurred  in the system.  necessary  to establish  the tariff  range.
Could  be a very important  aspect  in terms  of
Step 2. Determination  of  the cost accounting  system  to be used.  homogeneity  of information  across  different
concessionaires.
Step 3.  Allocation of indirect costs. It should  be a standard  How  indirect  costs  are  allocated  depends  on
procedure  and  methodology  that  took  into  account  the  financial  and  a range  of  factors.  These  can  include  the
economic  equilibrium  of  the concessionaire  and  the nature  of the  importance  of  the passenger  services  to the
passenger  service  (for  example,  frequency).  freight  operator.
Step 3. Comparative  analysis  of  the tariff,  against  similar  users  in
the same  market;  other  users  in other  markets  within  Argentina;  and  established  throunh  ty check  on  the  figures
other  users  in other  countries.  etbihdtruhtecluain
4.3.4  An example: the Ferroexpreso Pampeano case16
The methodology can be illustrated with the information currently available to CNRT in the
case of the Ferroexpreso Pampeano concessionaire. This seems a suitable example not
only  because of the data availability, but also because - as mentioned above - this  is
possibly  a  concessionaire that  would greatly benefit from  a  new  agreement on  access
prices. Ferroexpreso Pampeano's  (FEPSA) network comprises about 5,000 kms that run
southwest Buenos Aires  and  connects this  city with  the important Bahia Blanca  area.
FEPSA is one of the freight concessionaires more crudely affected by the lack of payments
of access fees by  the provincial Governments. In  1991 the access prices were  set  for
Ferrocarriles Argentinos through a Convenio or agreement with the Governments. After
the privatization process started, in 1993 the agreement was between the Unidad Ejecutora
Provincial (UEPFP), the entity that exploited the intercity passenger railroads, and FEPSA,
and its terms were honored until 1995. From 1995 to 2000, the UEPFP has refused to pay -
on accounts of lack of investments - and FEPSA estimates an accumulated debt of $40
million. FEPSA's operating characteristics in years  1997-1998 are summarized in Table
4.3. Since 1992 the company has experienced a steady growth in traffic volume from 1.9
million of tons to about 2.4 million in 1999. However this figures are well below capacity,
since the average load factor during this period has been around 50%. In accumulated terms
demand in 1999 was a 40% below supply.
16 FEPSA  has already conducted  its own study  on access  prices (see FEPSA,  2000),  but no major  initiatives
had been  taken until December  2000.  It is quite likely  that the revision  of access  charges  will be one of the
key issues  in the next renegotiations  between  freight concessionaires  and the Government.  Information  for
this section  comes  from  this study  and Polo  (2000).
29Table 4.3. Basic operating  infornation  of FEPSA
oo i  ot  1,955,853  1,924,399
hLo  omot  ives-h  ours  129,381  126,224
frei  ghttrais  100,397  98,780
no-oper  gatin  trains  28,984  27,444
Ton-kilometers (  0  0000  2,710,640,183  2,964,630,767
Train-kilometers  1,890,853  2,101,766
freight  1,573,053  1,804,181
pseg 0;00  ;  400317,800  297,585
Trains  ;;t0000  t0;t00  5,559  5,681
0  :,freight  4,315  4,514
1,244  5,681
Source: Polo (2000)
In  absolute  terms,  passenger  traffic  represented  in  1998  a  16% of  the  train-
kilometers  or  22%  of  total  trains  running  on  the  network.  However,  their  relative
importance in total tonnage varies across routes and lines, and depends on the frequency
and  the number of passengers involved. Although the  weighted average for the  entire
network has been estimated in 13.7% (FEPSA, 2000), a figure larger than in previous years
due to the relative stability of freight figures, FEPSA distinguishes among three types  of
lines:
*  few passenger services: those where passenger services represent a minimum
part of the total tonnage in the corresponding sector (less than 5% of the total).
- minor passenger services: those lines with a significant portion of passenger
services, but  still  in minority compared to  freight tonnage (between  10-18% of
total).
*  major passenger services: those where passenger traffic is predominant (with a
share of between 43 and 86%).
Using the methodology proposed in Table 4.2 above, the first step to compute the
adequate access prices would consist of the identification of the direct costs attributable to
these passenger trains. Since no major new track investments have been carried out for the
specific purpose  of  improving the  quality of the track  needed  for passenger  services.
FEPSA  can be  assumed to  face no  incremental cost  of  a  new track.  With respect  to
incremental operating cost, as discussed above, they are incurred when capacity is close to
full utilization and (obligatory) passenger trains delay or impede freight trains to run. This
is not the case of FEPSA either because the frequencies of the passenger trains (3 or 4
trains per week in densest routes) are relatively low at the moment.
30Table  4.4. FEPSA's  maintenance  costs attributable  to passenger  trains
Gross to-m  Cost  per  Cost  atttilbutabte  Annual  cost
Length Matntenance  (¶300)  passngor  attrbutatble
-ange(m.)grsss*ton  toj  pss  Imis  tonor  |
PassengerSector)sos  -($km)Freight  Passenger  km  iii(1on4)  (trvins) J  ($taslnicm
FEW  PASSENGER  SERVICES
from Bragado  to Pehuaj6  154  2,180  1,204  156  0.00160  250  312  0.80
from Pehuaj6  toCatril6  160  1,394  1,170  156  0.00105  164  312  0.53
from Catril6  toToay  92  750  44.6  109.2  0.00487  532  312  1.71
from Toay to General  Pico  91  1,166  1,374.8  78  0.00080  63  312  0.20
'____.____.____.____.____.____.____.____.___.____.____.____._  Average  0.77
MINOR  PASSENGER  SERVICES
from Olavaria  to  Lamadrid  93  750  1,115  228.8  0.00220  504  416  1.21
from Lamadrid  to Coronel  Suarez  64  1,020  1,080.9  228.8  0.00078  178  416  0.43
from Coronel  Suarez to Pigue  48  7,906  1,518.9  228.8  0.00452  1,035  416  2.49
from Pigue to Saavedra  20  1,867  1,717.5  228.8  0.00096  219  416  0.53
from Saavedra  to Naposta  84  1,333  1,970.3  228.8  0.00061  139  416  0.33
from Naposta  to Bahia  Blanca  40  11,198  1,970.3  228.8  0.00542  1,240  416  2.98
. . ,  _  ____._._._._._._______.___._____  |  Average  1.20
MAJOR  PASSENGER  SERVICES
from Lincoln  to Roberts  44  [  750  26.8  20.8  0.01574  327  104  3.15
from Roberts  toCuenca  60  750  3.3  20.8  0.03101  645  104  6.20
Average  4.91
Source: FEPSA  (2000)The concessionaire has often claimed that when passenger trains have accidents, the
subsequent bottleneck and the towing and clearing expenses are paid by FEPSA itself. If
available data on the average number of such incidents per year (and the associated costs)
were available, they should be included in the calculation. The major item to be included in
the direct incremental costs is the incremental maintenance costs.
According to FEPSA (2000) the average maintenance cost for the entire network
can be estimated in 1.11$/ train-km, although this figure widely varies across the three
types  of  passenger  lines  identified above. For the few  passenger  services  routes,  the
attributable cost can be very low (for example 0.20$ per train/km), but the average is 0.77$.
For the minor passenger  services  lines, the cost range is between 0.43 and 2.98$ per train-
km (with a mean value of 1.20). Finally, in the case of major passenger services routes, this
cost can be as high as 6.2$ per train-km, with an average of 4.91$.
As presented in Table 4.4, the calculation of these figures from the point of view of
the regulatory agency only requires a detailed disaggregation of maintenance costs and
operating data by those routes affected by passenger traffic. This procedure is currently
available  to  CNRT,  which  would  only  require  more  disaggregated  data  from  the
concessionaires. It is very important to choose an adequate weighting criteria to balance the
impact of the different types of lines.
This  definition  of  the  informational requirements  would  constitute  step  2,  as
mentioned in  Table 4.2 above. As  it has  been suggested in  other sections, in  order to
estimate an adequate access price it is very important to define a homogeneous set of rules
that  guarantee  a  minimum  level  of  homogeneity  of  information  across  different
concessionaires. Technically speaking, setting a single access price for the entire network
requires that the information used in the different computations (for example, what each
concessionaire considers a "maintenance cost" match exactly across concessionaires. It is
obviously possible to set different access prices for different parts of the network, but this
solution  has  been  scarcely  favored  in  most  countries  due  to  the  legal  and  political
complications that might arise.
Table  4.5.  Cost  structure  of  a typical  freight  train  in  Argentina
Direct  0cstS00Tnkm  0$0  Indir;c costs  S'Ton-km
Train crew  0.0025  7.4  Infrastructure  0.0019  5.6
Fuel  and energy  0.0025  7.4  Maintenance  of  infrastr.  0.0005  1.5
Maintenance  0.0043  12.7  Stations  0.0041  12.1
Amortization  0.0021  6.2  Administration  0.0034  10.1
Other  direct  costs  0.0021  6.2  Other  indirect  costs  0.0104  30.8
Total  direct  costs  0.0135  39.9  Total  indirect  costs  0.0203  60.1_
Source: Polo (2000).Once the direct costs associated with passenger trains have been estimated, the next
step towards computing the adequate access price consists in the allocation of indirect
costs. As discussed above, there are many approaches. Polo (2000) presents in Table 4.5, a
typical  cost  structure  of  a  representative  Argentine  freight  railroad  in  $/ton-m  and
percentages. The calculations have been carried out considering a 1,500-tons train, loaded
with  grain, and for an average haul of 220 kms and they show that indirect costs may
represent about 60% of total  costs. This would be  a reasonable  starting point for  any
discussion.
Step 3 requires the allocation of indirect costs. The allocation of fixed and common
costs, as described in Section 4.3.2, would require the choice of one of the specific methods
available. CNRT has access to  general accounting and financial information from each
concessionaire and most of should be sufficient to apply any of the methods. A final figure
for the indirect cost attributable to each passenger train could be obtained. Surprisingly,
FEPSA's  own  study  does  not  include  any  reference to  these  indirect  costs  in  their
estimation of the adequate access fee. In FEPSA (2000) it is simply considered that the
direct maintenance cost of 1.11$ per train-km is sufficient to cover the major incremental
cost incurred by the freight operator as a consequence of intercity passenger trains. It is
then implicitly assumed that the difference between this value and the actual price of 2.50$
per train-km is enough for the indirect costs. When compared to international standards
(taking into account differences for traffic density and different maintenance and labor
costs) these figures seem reasonable (see for example, Campos and Cantos, 2000).
4.3.5  Where do we go from here?
In sum, CNRT is not too far off from being able to take an analytically sound position
regarding access prices. It may have to start with an inventory of the routes significantly
affected by access issues both in the case of freight and commuter concessionaires. Second,
it may have to request the operators to disaggregate the information they send to CNRT the
level of these routes, at least with respect to operating information and most relevant direct
costs. Third, CNRT should pick a reasonable procedure for allocating indirect costs should
be  chosen. The resulting access prices should be balanced to  take  into account future
investments in tracks to make sure that future needs are not omitted.
5.  OTHER  USES OF REGULATORY  ACCOUNTING
After reviewing in regulatory demands of efficiency measurement procedures and access
pricing techniques, this final section provides a general discussion of other possible uses of
regulatory accounting. In particular, we focus on the need for model of the firm's financial
behavior. The need of the model arises not only from the obvious need of informing price-
setting decisions, but also for the subtler purpose of defining the size of the cake to share
between the different parties in any contract renegotiation.
335.1.  Collecting financial information for price-setting and price-revision
The mechanisms needed to set and revise a price-controls in any concession is quite well
established. They involved a series of data requirements most regulators would consider
reasonable. 17 This section discusses these data requirements and makes an assessment as to
how CRNT fares in this respect for its railways responsibilities. Most regulators start by
asking the company for information on its present and projected operating costs, its assets,
its investment plans, and its demand forecasts. In Argentina, CNRT currently collects most
of this information. The problems is that, as mentioned earlier, the application of some light
consistency tests  to the data collected and published raises some doubts  on its quality.
Routine tests include checks that the operators are not predicting excessive operating costs
or investments systematically or controls for some patterns in the errors which have tended.
to be quite common among the operators. This has probably never been a major problem
for CNRT because the data has generally been used in a passive way by the regulators. Yet
the forecast offered by the operators have been so frequently off that it seems reasonable to
wonder why the regulator has not yet decided to  sharpen its regulatory in this  respect.
These  forecasts are  coming  up  in  any  tariff  revision  and  should  hence  be  assessed
independently by the regulator.
The regulator also needs a realistic valuation of the firm's  assets as well as their
depreciation  rate.  This  has  always  proved  an  extremely  controversial  area  and  yet
regulatory  asset  valuation  is  at  the  core  of  any  regulatory  system.  The  valuation  of
Argentina's  asset  from the viewpoint of the regulators is  not  sufficiently linked to  its
regulatory needs.  In principle the regulator should have a clear idea as to whether the
current cost value of the assets, or another value reflects the price at which the assets have
been concessioned. They seem to be using current costs values. Yet, where possible, the
international experience suggests that regulators should steer away from using current cost
values as a basis for regulation and instead derive a regulatory value, based upon the traded
value of the assets rolled forward by net investment. For the concessions that have changed
hand since the beginning of the reform, the existing assets valuations should be reassessed.
This is all the more important since the depreciation profile reflects this choice of asset
valuation. It should be assessed on the regulatory, rather than current cost value. For the
business which have lost value (mostly freight), the depreciation schedule is likely to be
much too generous, providing an implicit subsidy to the operators and vice versa for the
businesses which  have  gained value  (mostly suburban passenger).  This  avoids  giving
investors a return on assets valued at a higher price by the regulator than was actually paid
by investors (see Burns and Estache, 1998).
Once the costs have been forecasted and the assets valuated, the following step is to
project the company's revenue requirement. This is not done on a regular basis by CNRT,
rather it comes up as part of renegotiation and even in those cases, it tends to be based on a
17 Green and Rodriguez-Pardina (1999) provide a detailed account.
34standard traditional  accounting approach. 18 This is  fine when the accounting system is
reliable and comparable across companies and when there is no  cash constraint for the
operators. This is not the case in Argentina and until the accounting system is beefed up, it
may be a reasonable approach to forecast revenue based on the cash flow approach. In the
more traditional accounting based method, over the price control period, revenues should
be expected to cover: operating costs; plus depreciation; plus a return on capital. The cash-
flow approach sets regulated revenues over  a price control period equal to: the present
value of operating and capital expenditures forecasted for the period; plus the present value
of the expected change in the asset value over the period.
Under either method, apart from operating costs, investments, asset values, and
depreciation rates, the regulatory agency also need a cost of capital as a critical input to
proceed with the calculation of the allowable revenue. The cost of capital is  always a
contentious issue in regulation. It is necessary to compute the weighted average cost of total
capital (WACC) - including debt plus equity - to provide a return to investors and sustain
the asset base, but few regulatory agency do it in a consistent way.'9 Formally,
WACC  = g * rd + (1 - g)  re
where g is the level of gearing in a company, i.e. the proportion of debt in the total capital
structure; rd  is the cost of debt finance. This is simply measured as risk free rate, rf  plus a
debt premium over this rate. The premium is either measured directly from the yield of a
company's bond or through comparator information and re is the cost of equity finance; its
estimation raises bigger problems and yet for privatized infrastructure monopolies, it is
quite important since access to debt finance can be quite restricted for many developing
countries privatization projects. One of the common approaches adopted to measuring the
cost of equity is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This estimates the cost of
equity as:
re  = rf +  De  (rm  - rf)
where: re is the cost of equity finance; rf is the risk-free return; Pe is the equity beta which
measures the  relative  riskiness  of  the  company's  equity  (and  sometimes the  sector's
riskiness) compared to the market as a whole; its value depends on the type of regulation
used; rm is the  level of market  return;  and rm - rf is the  market  risk premium.  Establishing
18  There  are  two equivalent  methods to  calculate allowable  revenue: the  cash  flow  approach  and  the
traditional  accounting  based  method.  The first of these  components  ensures  that the business  can conduct  its
on-going  activities;  the second  maintains  the value  of existing  assets  so that  any expropriation  of asset  value is
made  transparent.
19 For a quick review  of how to estimate  this cost  of capital,  see Alexander  and Estache  (1997); for a more
detailed  analysis,  see Alexander  et al. (1996).
35the values for each of these items is relatively  straightforward when developed capital
markets exist and companies are quoted on a stock exchange. 20
Finally, it makes a lot of sense for the regulator to have some demand forecasts to
check the consistency with the required revenue and to ensure that price elasticities and
tariff levels are combined in a way that allows the allowable revenue to be  met within
reasonable margins. Once more, CNRT has little formal information on demand for the
system and for each operator. The Secretariat has taken the lead on tariff setting which
continues to  be  a  major political  issue. A  better demand study  combining ability and
willingness  to  pay  would  probably yield  combinations of  traffic  levels  and  revenue
simulations that would reveal more explicitly the economic consequences of the political
constraints on any tariff revision.
The overall consistency of the variables discussed here should be checked within a
regulatory financial model that must translate estimated allowable revenues into prices for
each service or product. A lot of the relevant information should have been generated as
part  of  the  reform  process  itself  and  would  have  been  revised  many  time  since.
Unfortunately, most of the information available needs to be updated and improved. CNRT
is a young agency established well after the concession contracts were in place and had
therefore to accept a situation that was imposed by other circumstances. Developing this
financial model for each one of the concessions it is monitoring should be at the top of its
agenda and would generate a lot of the data it needs to  measure efficiency and access
prices.
5.2.  A financial model for contract renegotiation
Regulatory accounting can also help in contract renegotiations. After more than six vears of
private operation, at the beginning of 2001 the Argentine rail concessionaires are immersed
in a renegotiation process with the Government. As any other renegotiation, this will imply
a redefinition of the size and type of the "cake" to be shared between the  Government
(national and provincial), the users and the operators. While the role played by CNRT in
this process is minimum, it could design the financial models it needs to build to help the
Secretariat in its renegotiation. A well designed mode will allow a check of the intemnal
consistency of all the contractual obligations and rights of each operator.
As mentioned in Section 2, the five existing freight concessions were designed for a
30-year duration with  an optional  10-year extension, and the  commuter railways were
concessioned for a 10 year period. However, by Presidential Decree 605/97, the Executive
ordered  the  Secretary  of  Transportation and  Public  Works to  modify  the  concession
contracts, following the authorization to do so by the Comisi6n Bicameral de Reforma del
20  A companion  paper by Estache  and Strong  (2001)  provides  back of the envelope  estimates  of this cost of
capital  for  various  sectors  in Argentina.
36Estado  in April  1996.21  The reasons for renegotiation alluded to  in the decree  include
"unforeseen changes in conditions, which made contract plans incompatible with the level
and composition of the demand," in part due to a "shortfall in actual demand relative to
expected demand."
5.2.1.  A financial model of the renegotiation  process
Renegotiation requirements in the  decree  included four  important constraints.  First,  it
cannot affect the "economic and financial equation" of the concessions (i.e., leaving profits
constant in net present value terms which is essentially a profit cap). Second, it preserves
the degree of entrepreneurial risk assumed at the time of competition for the market. Third,
it introduces flexibility to formal (or input) requirements but  respecting substantial (or
output) results. Lastly, the agreements are subject to both internal and external scrutiny by
auditors and the Bicameral Reform Commission.
The first requirement is probably the most difficult to meet, since renegotiations are
carried out in a context of asymmetric information penalizing CNRT. Having an explicit
financial model for each concession could not only make a significant difference in the
Government's strategy, but also become necessary to define its bargaining margins. As in
the case of price-setting, this somewhat more complex model should be constructed around
the financial position of the concessionaire and define the implications or consequences of
the renegotiation.
The concept of cost of capital and its interrelationship  with the rate of return of each
concessionaire is at the heart of this financial model. Very broadly, the discounted rate of
return (RoR) that investors in the company expect to receive, measured as the difference
between revenues (Rt) and costs (C,) over a T-period project should be at least equal to the
cost of capital (WACC),
[RoR] x [capital] =  '  - WACC x [capital],
,=0  (I+ d)'
where d reflects the appropriate discount rate and capital is debt (D) plus equity (E). In its
attempt to guarantee at least competitive  returns in the long run, it is common for regulatory
policy to employ a cost of capital as one of the major determinants of either the rate of
return or the price cap in regulated industries.
In a conventional non-regulated business, the cost of capital is typically used as an
opportunity cost of funds and it is often the rate at which future profits are discounted into
the present. If  this  discounted value is positive, the business is  worth the investment.
Otherwise, the investors would get a larger return elsewhere. In the arena of regulated
business - such as the railways in Argentina - the role of the cost of capital is different.
21 During 1995 the Government was trying to renegotiate the contracts without going through Congress. The Commission
opposed these attempts arguing that the discussion disregarded important issues such as the dispute over access charges
involving the provincial operator (UEPFP) in Buenos Aires.
37Prices are regulated to limit market power and mimic, if possible, a price structure that is
closer to what would occur if the companies faced competitive forces. In these cases the
viability of an industry is basically taken as given and the cost of capital just measures the
return the regulator allows the private firm to obtain.
5.2.2.  An example: the commuter services renegotiation
It is possible to provide an illustrative example of the previous reasoning in the case of
Argentina'  commuter services based on the information available publicly. This is by no
means a rigorous assessement of a specific renegotiation. The main purpose is to  show
how, with some simple simulations, a regulator can make a better assessment of trade-offs
in renegotiations options.
Consider Ferrovias, the concessionaire of the Belgrano Norte Line in Buenos Aires.
The  concession started in  April  1,  1994. It basically  included a  10-year "rehabilitate,
operate and transfer" (ROT) concession (that could be further extended for consecutive 10-
year terms upon Government's approval). The network comprised a 54 km diesel suburban
railway connecting the Retiro terminal area with five suburban municipalities northwest of
Buenos Aires (22 stations).
The  concessionaire  committed  to  operate  the  system,  execute  an  investment
program, and maintain the existing track and rolling stock. The owner of the track, stations
and rolling stock would remain the National Government. The basic investment program
was financed by the National Government and carried out by the concessionaire; it included
the acquisition of new rolling stock and incorporation of renovated rolling stock, partial
track  renewal, installation of automatic  signaling system, installation of  gates at grade
crossings, construction of underpasses, new terminal and transfer center. Any change to the
timing or size of these obligations clearly implies a change in the value of the business of
the  operator.  In  addition,  the  Government  sets  maximum  fares  and  subsidizes  the
operations. Prices  are  subject to  automatic  increases according to  the  service  quality
achieved,  and  increases in  the  US  CPI. Non-achievement  of  quality  levels results  in
financial penalties. Other penalties are levied in case of non-compliance with regulatory
requirements and other punishable actions (safety, maintenance, etc). Table 5.1 summarizes
these  values. Once  more  any  changes to  these  pricing and  revenue  driving  variables
changes the value of the business as well.
Table  5.1.  Investment  program  and  penalties
$ thouands  asic nvestmen  t  Program  Penaf:  tie ('0  )  0000000
Period  Contract  Actual  Levied  Paid
1994-1999  47,890  42,140  50.9  44.9
Source:  CNRT  (2000).  (*)  No disaggregated  annual  figures  were  available.
Table 5.2 summarizes the financial position of Ferrovias in the 1994-1999 period.
Note that the initial year (1994) only includes seven months and that accounting year goes
from June to June. The concessionaire' capital structure is mainly equity (70%) and short-
term  debt  with  suppliers  of  rolling  stock  and  maintenance  services.  Although  the
38Government finances investment on infrastructure, in most cases the companies have to
supply  money  in  advance.  They  discount commercial paper  against  the  Government
promises of payment at rates of 17-25% depending on specific projects and the economic
environment. None of the concessionaires has raised long-term debt in large amounts since
ticket sales. With subsidies and  discounted paper, this is enough to cover most expenses.
Table  5.2.  Ferrovias  financial  data  (1994-1999)
(in  $  thousands)-  1994  1995  1996  1)97  -19  1999
Subsidibs  5261.7  24539.9  23441.5  24128.0  24236.2  23559.0
Passngerrevenues  1443.4  8494.6  11210.4  11943.4  17613.2  19047.4
Investmettr.ansfes  - 78.9  12678.3  17348.6  4208.1  14619.1
Access  revenues  6.3  85.4  31.4  - -
Othe revenues  112.9  877.2  1196.0  1361.6  1249.3  293.3
Total revenues  (R)  6824.4  34076.2  48557.8  54781.8  47307.0  57518.9
Operatng costs  5655.6  28399.5  40331.9  45514.7  37586.0  44328.6
Other  costs  1002.4  5223.2  7706.4  6828.7  6981.6  11364.3
Canon  paytents  - - - - - -
Penatesf  7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5
Total  costs (C)  6658.0  33622.7  48038.3  52343.4  44567.6  55692.9
Debt  5655.4  6181.5  10959.0  13675.7  15089.8  20351.9
cEquity  3314.7  3723.9  4061.1  6041.0  5823.8  5666.9
Source:  CNRT  (2000).  (*)  Paid  penalties  have  been  equally  distributed  among  the six  year  period.
The  cost  of  equity  is  more  difficult to  approximate. Alexander  et  al.  (1996)
estimated betas between 0.74 and 0.86 for electricity and telecom companies in Argentina
between 1992-95. Green and Rodriguez-Pardina (1999) estimated that the cost of equity
varied between 16.04-17.75% in the Argentine gas industry in 1996. A figure of 18% could
be appropriated for this example, although it is well above the corresponding value for the
Brazilian rail industry (see Alexander et al., 1999).
These figures let us estimate a rough initial value of the concessionaire's IRR from
the point of view of the regulatory agency. However, since only 6 of the initial  10-year
period (1994-2004) is currently available, it is first necessary to extrapolate the 1994-1999
values into the remaining four years. As in the case of efficiency measurement, there are
many alternatives procedures available, but none of them is completely free of criticisms. 22
Since we  only  intend to  illustrate the arguments described above, we  have chosen  to
calculate the average of the total  revenues, R (41,511 $ thousands) and total  costs,  C
22 Single  and multiple  variable  regressions  taking  into account  microeconomic  and macroeconomic  conditions
could possible  be one of the most complete  methods,  but we lack enough information.  For this example,
other, simpler  mechanisms  are pTeferable.
39($40,161), and the  same method for debt, D, and equity, E,  (resulting in  $11,900 and
$4,700 thousands, respectively). Thus, using the expression
RoR =  T I' R-C',  (D +  E),
1=(I+  d)'
under different discount rates (d=0.  15, 0.20 and 0.25), the corresponding RoR for Ferrovias
for its initial  concession term (T=10) with the capital structure evaluated in  year 2000
would be: 23 Note that as mentioned earlier, any change in the contract will change R and C'
and this should in principle be simulated in detail by the regulator before plugging in the
final data in the final equation.
Table  5.3.  Simulated  rate  of  return  for  Ferrovias  (1994-2004)
D  0.1S  0.20  0.2
E  (R, -C,)  /(1  + d)'  6272,4  4948,7  3979,2
D+E  (average)  16757,5  16757,5  16757,5
RoR  37.4%  29.5%  23.7%
whereas the calculated WACC for year 2000 would be, with g-= 71.5%, re=l  8% and r,i=l7-
25%, between 17.2 and 23%. In spite of the evident limitations of the calculations provided
by this example, the difference with the estimated RoR and WACC for Ferrovias shows that
the business looks better the more patient the investors are since the highest discount rates
get them very close to the break even point. If these results are representative, the concerris
that the operators are expressing currently with the business suggest that they have discount
rate  which  are  even  higher  than  25%  since  most  claim  to  be  losing  money.  Any
renegotiation than gets the operators to be more patient-i.e.  decrease the rate of time
preference-will  help in keeping them on board.
In June 1997 Decree No. 543 was enacted, authorizing the Transport Secretariat to
re-negotiate the concession agreements. The terms of the new contract were agreed on with
the Transport Secretariat at the end of 1999 and they included changes in the duration of the
concession, a new investment plan and selective price increases. These changes, published
in a document called "Addenda 1999", were contested by the new administration that came
to power in 2000. The new Government negotiated again with Ferrovias some adjustments
to the changes and a new document, "Revision 2000" was published. As summarized in
Table  5.4, the main  differences between the outcomes of the two  renegotiations were
related to the extension of the concession, the tariff increase and the new investment plan.
In both cases, new valuations of assets were in place as well as revisions of the penalty
system.
23 If we had taken year 1999 capital structure of $26,018 thousands, the corresponding RoR would have been
24%,  19% and 15%, respectively.
40Table  5.4.  Renegotiations  of Ferrovias  concession:  1999  and  2000
Addenda  1999  Revision  2000
Extension  of  concession  30  years  24  years
Tariff ncreas  100%  in 6 years  84.8%  in 6 years
Tatiff  Increae for lonjurneys  80-90%  28-38%
Electrification  of  track  between  Retiro  +16 km  electrified  + 3 new  junctions.
and  Villa  Rosa,  refurbishing  of  all  22  Total  program  $338.7  million
New  Investme  pram  stations,  including  bus/rail  interchanges,
acquisition  of new  rolling  stock,  and
construction  of new  road-rail  crosses
New  valuation  of  roWng  stock  Electric  cars:  $2 million  by  car  Electric  cars:  $1.5  million  by  car
New  vauation  of lnter  $79  million  $8.8  million
Demand  projton  +52%  in concession  period  +35%  in concession  period
Improvement  of  the  penalty  system
Oter Issues
Control  of  the  funds  generated  by  tariff  increase
Source:  www.mecon.gov.ar
Any  of  these  changes  has  implications for  the  calculations  made  above.  For
example, a greater extension of the concession modifies the value of T; tariffs increases or
changes  in  the  demand  projection affect  the value  of  the  revenues  (R),  whereas  the
valuation of the assets of the changes in the penalty system would change the costs (C).
Using  the  information  from  Table  5.4,  CNRT  should  be  able  to  provide  a  general
framework on the consequences of the renegotiation for each of the concessionaires in
terms of their expected RoR. For example, Table 5.5 roughly re-calculates the RoRs  in
Table 5.3 according to the outcomes of the "Revision 2000" document. 24 The results, show
as that for the three discount factors of d=0.  1  5,0.20 and 0.25-which  approximate the rate
of  time  preference  of  the  operator--,  the  concessionaires'  position  is  not  changing
dramatically. It improves somewhat if the operator is not in a hurry and is patient enough to
get the benefits of its investment. For operator more in a hurry, the renegotiation leaves
them  a  little  worse  off  but  not  significantly.  There  is  no  doubt  that  any  private
concessionaire uses its  own financial model in the renegotiation process. So should the
regulator,  and these estimated values -calculated  with more sophisticated techniques -
could be used as a guide for the renegotiation.
24  It is considered that subsidies will be reduced (on average) by a 30% and passenger revenues increased by a
30% from 2000 with respect to  1999 values; investment transfers  of $338 million are evenly distributed
among the 17 years, whereas access and other revenues remain unchanged  with respect to Table 5.3.
Operating costs are increased by a 20% on average since 2000 with respect to  1999 values, whereas other
costs are unchanged.
41Table  5.4.  Simulated  rate  of return  for Ferrovias  (Revision  2000)
,  (R, -C,)  /(I +  d)'  10126,4  7133,7  5288,8
D+E  (1999)  26018,8  26018,8  26018,8
RoR  38.9%  27.4%  20.3%
In conclusion, this section has shown using a relatively new approach that the uses
of regulatory accounting go further than a simple collection of information with control
purposes. Balance sheets and financial statements can be used by the regulator to simulate
the financial models of the firms. This is "as if'  the regulatory agency adopted the firm's
point of view, which undoubtedly could lessen the asymmetric information problem. In the
case of Argentina, we have provided several examples on the way these financial models
could be used in the context of the privatized rail industry.25
6.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper has attempted to address a very simple question: how to regulate a sector which
is no longer under direct control of the Government, after a concessioning process carried
out under diverse circumstances, and where available information is now mainly provided
by private operators. Unfortunately, the answer is not equally simple. In most developing
countries, one of the effects of the lack of experience in setting up concession agreements
has often been that the resulting agreements did not clearly define all of the information
needed to carry out the oversight role and the regulatory role.
In  Argentina, according to the reputation and institutional background of public
policy accumulated until the 1990s, rail concession contracts intended to be very specific
about the way in which tariffs, quality, investment, exclusivity, etc., would have to evolve
over time. Yet, some discretion was left to the newly created regulatory bodies to adjust
those contracts according to unforeseen developments. Nevertheless, the economic context
in which the initial privatizations were carried out did not allow the time to refine terms and
many loopholes remained. Naturally, those unforeseen events have come to pass, and the
regulatory agency - the CNRT - has had to  adapt its procedures and decisions to  the
available information. In some cases, the alleged modifications in the environment have
given place to renegotiations.
25  Green  and Rodriguez-Pardina (1999) provide a  model for the revision of  prices in privatized utilities.
However, they do not take explicitly into account the impact of renegotiation in the samne  way we do.
42The Argentine experience since setting up the concessions at the beginning of the
1990s has proven very helpful in highlighting the information not available that is currently
needed. Therefore, the changes to be introduced in the approach to information furnished to
the Government for purposes of oversight and regulation are now defined in a much more
clear way than six years ago. These changes encompass a number of dimensions of what it
widely known as regulatory accounting, but they could be summarized into four major
issues:
*  Harmonization and  comparison of accounting data. Taking into account its
limited resources,  CNRT is currently doing  a very  important job  in  collecting  and
controlling the information provided by rail concessionaires. However, its function is
mostly passive, and a more proactive use of its capabilities is missed. The causes of this
are not  only  attributable to  CNRT's  deficiencies, since - for  example - a  lack of
comparability among balance sheet data limits the ability of the regulator to compare
the  relative  performance of  the  companies  or  to  employ  techniques  of  yardstick
competition.
*  Efficiency  measurement.  The  comparison  of  performances  could  be  also
completed with an adequate measurement of efficiency, whose advantages have been
described in Section 3. Increasing the fairness of the regulatory process is for example a
good reason to proceed with this, and the regulator can create more transparent rules of
decisions. Estimating  a relatively simple synthetic benchmark  indicator of potential
efficiency achievements against which the compliance of each operator can be checked
provides a logic to regulatory assessments. In addition, the data requirements imposed
by these methods can also be used to generate new regulatory tools (such as yardstick
competition) which allows the comparison of the performance of an operator with that
of all others. But this, of course, requires reliable, comprehensive and consistent data,
which may be again the most pressing challenge CNRT is facing.
*  Access prices. With respect to this issue CNRT could play a more active role in
the disputes between the freight concessionaires and the provincial Governments on
access fees if the suitable mechanisms for calculating access prices were in place, as
described in Section 4. What it is needed is to identify the routes affected by access
issues and disaggregate at that level the information collected from the concessionaires.
. Financial model. Finally, the use  of a financial model in  regulation has been
shown in Section 5 to be a key element in regulation, not only from the point of view of
price revision but also as a supplementary tool in the renegotiation process. Regulatory
accounting goes further than a simple collection of information with control purposes.
Balance sheets and financial statements can be used by the regulator to simulate the
financial models of the firms. This is "as if'  the regulatory agency adopted the firm's
point of view, which undoubtedly could lessen the asymmetric information problem. In
the case of Argentina, we have provided several examples on the way these financial
models could be used in the context of the privatized rail industry.
It should be reckoned that at the beginning of year 2001 the circumstances in the
Argentina rail industry are not favorable for dramatic changes, but - as suggested in other
parts  of this  document - the current renegotiation process could be used  to adjust the
regulatory agency to the needs that have been revealed after six years of experience. If
43changes are not considered, Argentina could lose the advantages and experiences gained
since the 1990s.
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